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Assessing the Equity and Redistributive Effects of Taxation Reforms in 
Nigeria 
 





Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of poverty and inequality reduction 
through redistribution have indeed become critical concerns in many low- and middle-income 
countries, including Nigeria. Although redistribution results from the effect of tax revenue 
collections, micro household-level empirical analyses of the distributional effect of personal 
income tax (PIT) and value added tax (VAT) reforms in Nigeria have been scarcely carried 
out. This study for the first time quantitatively assessed both the equity and redistributive 
effects of PIT and VAT across different reform scenarios in Nigeria. Data used in this study 
was mainly drawn from the most recent large scale nationally representative Nigeria Living 
Standard Survey, conducted in 2018/2019. The Kakwani Index was used to calculate and 
compare the progressivity of PIT and VAT reforms. A simple static micro-simulation model 
was employed in assessing the redistributive effect of PIT and VAT reforms in the country. 
After informality has been accounted for, the PIT was found to be progressive in the pre-
2011 tax scheme, but turned regressive in the post-2011 tax scheme. It was also discovered 
that the newly introduced lump sum relief allowance in the post-2011 PIT scheme accrues 
more to the high-income than to the low-income taxpayers – confirming the regressivity of 
the current PIT scheme. However, the study further shows (through counterfactual 
simulations) that excluding the relatively high-income taxpayers from sharing in the variable 
part of the lump sum relief allowance makes PIT progressive in the post-2011 scheme. The 
VAT was uncovered to be regressive both in the pre-2020 scheme, and in the current VAT 
reform scheme. Further, after putting informality into consideration, the PIT was found to 
marginally reduce inequality but increase poverty in the pre-2011 scheme. The post-2011 
PIT scheme reduced inequality and increased poverty, but by a smaller proportion – 
confirming a limited redistribution mainly resulting from the concentration of the lump sum 
relief allowance at the top of the distribution. However, if the variable part of the lump sum 
relief allowance is provided for ‘only’ the low-income taxpayers below a predefined income 
threshold, the post-2011 PIT scheme becomes largely redistributive. VAT was uncovered to 
marginally increase inequality and poverty in the pre-2020 scheme. Though the current VAT 
scheme slightly increased inequality, it considerably increased poverty in the country. It is 
therefore suggested that a better tax reform, with well-regulated relief allowance and 
differentiated VAT rates, will help to enhance the equity and redistribution capacity of the 
Nigeria tax system.  
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Nigeria recorded robust economic growth averaging 7.1 per cent per annum in 2000–2014, 
and as at then, growth was higher than the average population growth rate of 2.6 per cent 
(World Development Indicators (WDI) 2020). In 2014, the country attained a gross domestic 
product (GDP) rebased at $510 billion and became the biggest African economy (National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2014; World Bank 2019). However, with the 2014–15 oil shock, 
the economy’s growth rate plunged to 2.7 per cent in 2015 and further down to -1.6 per cent 
in 2016. Though a gradual recovery has been observed since 2017, the Covid-19 related 
disruptions (lower oil prices and remittances, together with mobility restrictions) reversed 
Nigeria’s growth back to negative level (-1.8 per cent), resulting in the 2020 economic 
recession (World Bank Group 2020; WDI 2020).  
 
Despite strong economic growth in the earlier part of the decade (2000–2014), poverty 
reduction process remained slow (World Bank 2016). This was deepened by the 2014–15 oil 
shock, culminating in a declined living standard, as the sustained high population growth rate 
exceeded the growth rate of the economy (World Bank Group 2019). Consequently, the 
poverty rate has been on the rise, from 26 per cent in 1980 to 46 per cent in 2004 (NBS 
2012; World Bank 2013). Although a decline to 35 per cent was observed in 2010 (World 
Bank 2013), it has risen from 35 per cent seen in 2010 to 41 per cent more recently, in 2019 
(World Bank 2013; NBS 2020). And significant regional differences still exist, with poverty 
level up to 52.1 per cent in rural regions, but only 18 per cent in the urban part of the country 
(NBS 2020). More so, income inequality, as measured by the Gini index, worsened from 0.36 
in 2004 to 0.41 in 2013 (NBS 2018). Though inequality marginally declined to 0.40 in 2016 
(NBS 2018), the latest Commitment to Reducing Inequality Index (CRI) ranking reveals that 
the country remains at the bottom (Development Finance International and Oxfam 2020). In 
such an uncertain economic and social environment, there is considerable interest in 
exploring not just the costs and benefits of various policy options, but also their equity and 
redistributive attributes. The worrisome question becomes: is the Nigerian government 
making an optimal use of the policy instrument of taxation to achieve its goal of inequality 
and poverty reduction? 
 
In this context, this study not only assessed equity of taxation reform, but its effect on income 
inequality and poverty levels in Nigeria. The redistributive effect of taxation is of policy 
significance when, first, we are interested in the proportion of resources (disposable income) 
households may be left with to purchase other basic goods after making tax payments and, 
second, for other equity reasons. This will help us to clearly understand how the burden of 
personal income tax (PIT) and value added tax (VAT) are distributed across individuals, 
households, and groups of people. This study focuses on personal income tax, collected 
directly from the household as a key tax policy tool to achieve greater equity and 
redistribution. The focus on income taxation in Nigeria is motivated by the relatively most 
recent policy on its structure, adopted in 2011. Hence, it is timely to evaluate its progressivity 
and redistributive effects in the country. The 2011 tax system was derived from the old 
personal income tax (PIT) 1993, updated as the 2004 Act, with the aim to align with changes 
in the income of Nigerians. The most recent tax policy, however, replaced several 
controversial sections of the old act by not only changing the income tax table, but replacing 
all reliefs, including personal relief allowance, with a consolidated relief allowance (CRA) of 
₦200,0001 plus 20 per cent of gross income, with extra 8 per cent pension allowance. The 
latest law hence aims to provide a kind of tax relief, reduce the tax burden on all individuals, 
especially lower income earners, increase workers’ disposable income so that they can 
adjust for the effect of inflation and the high cost of living, and eliminate some of the 
loopholes that were previously being used to exploit taxpayers. Overall, the new 
 




amendments are meant to bring down income tax for many individuals in accordance with 
the national tax policy objective of reducing direct tax. Bearing these latest policy reforms in 
mind, one would specifically ask: to what extent has the most recent tax reform (including 
mainly the lump sum relief allowance) affected the tax burden of the individual income 
taxpayer in Nigeria? Growing literature for developing countries on the effect of tax relief 
allowances and deductions on equity and income redistribution argues that lump sum tax 
relief deduction tends to mainly favour rich taxpayers, and hence worsen equity and 
redistribution of income. Although tax relief and deductions are introduced and driven by 
equity objectives, to help improve the welfare of individuals in the low-income class, extant 
empirical studies (Avram 2017; Cano 2017; Inchauste and Rubil 2017) reveal that the relief 
deductions mainly benefit the individual taxpayers at the top of the income class, relative to 
the taxpayers in the low-income category. The current study examined this issue, for the first 
time in the context of Nigeria, by looking at the counterfactual2 simulated effect of the 
recently introduced lump sum relief allowance (₦200,000 plus 28 per cent of income) on the 
equity and redistribution of the income tax policy tool. 
 
Further, this paper focuses on VAT as a major indirect tax policy tool used in manipulating 
the distribution of resources in Nigeria. It directly affects individuals, and accounts for a 
significant fraction of the country’s total indirect tax revenue.3 The focus on the redistributive 
potential of VAT is mainly motivated by the recent increase in VAT by the Nigeria federal 
government, from its 5 per cent rate since 1993 to 7.5 per cent in 2020. It is indeed timely, 
however, to examine the likely effect of this policy change (a 50 per cent increase in VAT 
rate) on poverty and income inequality in Nigeria. VAT, which replaced the sales tax, was 
first introduced in Nigeria through the decree No. 102 of 1993 and became effective on 1 
January 1994. Since this period, the VAT in Nigeria has remained at the rate of 5 per cent. 
Bearing in mind the fact that the Nigerian VAT rate is one of the lowest among peer countries 
(e.g. Ghana and South Africa), the Federal Executive Council proposed on 11 September 
2019 a new VAT rate of 7.5 per cent for the country, up from the current 5 per cent. 
Following from the above, therefore, this research attempts to broaden our understanding of 
tax and development issues by analysing for the first time the extent to which the relatively 
recent income tax policy reform has affected the distribution of income and poverty levels. 
Further, the study tries to, for the first time, take into account the possible effect of the new 
policy of a 50 per cent increase in VAT on household income inequality and poverty levels. 
Hence, it is expected that the results of this study will help to inform policy makers who are 
interested in tax equity issues with options to better reform the country’s tax financing 
systems. 
 
Currently, literature on the redistributive effect of personal income tax in Nigeria appears to 
be very scanty. A related available published article (Egbon and Mgbame 2015) in Nigeria is 
plainly a conceptual analysis of personal income tax progressivity, with no effort to analyse 
any form of micro household survey data. Ichoku and Anuku (2019) only used state level 
(i.e., very small sample) data to analyse the effect of only personal income tax on income 
inequality, ignoring its effect on poverty levels in Nigeria. Other studies (Obaretin, Akhor and 
Oseghale 2017; Anyaduba and Otulugbu 2019) on this issue in Nigeria have only used 
macro level time series data, which is clearly unable to rigorously speak to equity and 
redistribution issues at the household level. The current study, however, attempts to use the 
most recent large nationally representative household survey to quantitatively analyse at the 
micro level not just the progressivity of personal income tax, but its effect on both income 
inequality and poverty levels in Nigeria. Ascertaining whether a tax policy is progressive or 
regressive is not enough to figure out its effect on inequality and poverty. Hence, the need to 
also estimate the marginal contributions of taxes on inequality and poverty levels (Inchauste 
 
2  A counterfactual effect predicts what would happen (in this case to progressivity and redistribution) if changes in the 
distribution of the relief allowance were to be implemented.  
3  Revenue from value added tax is about 54 per cent of total indirect tax revenue in Nigeria. See Table 1 below. 
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and Lustig 2017). Further, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the current study is the first 
in Nigeria that attempts to analyse the extent to which the 2011 income tax reform has 
affected the distribution of income and poverty within the country. More so, to the best of the 
author’s knowledge, quantitative household-level micro studies on progressivity and the 
redistributive effect of value added tax reforms in Nigeria are very rare. For instance, 
available studies (Oboh and Eromonsele 2018; Anyaduba and Otulugbu 2019) on the effect 
of value added tax on income inequality in the country have mainly used macro level time 
series data, with little or no effort to investigate its effect on poverty levels. Hence, to extend 
existing knowledge and contribute to defining recommendations on a nuanced approach to 
fighting poverty and bridging the income gap between the poor and the rich, the current study 
carried out a household-level micro analysis of the progressivity and the distributional effects 
of income tax and value added tax reforms on various poverty indices (poverty headcount, 
poverty gap and poverty severity) and income inequality across national and regional levels 
using the standard Kakwani Index and simple static micro-simulation model. 
 
It is crucial to note at this point that research works on taxation and development in 
developing countries have tended to ignore informal tax systems, usually focusing on formal 
taxes alone. However, it is widely known that people in the informal sector hardly contribute 
to formal taxes – income or value added taxes. Recently, growing research on taxes in low 
and middle-income countries suggests that the partial focus on formal taxation often fails to 
observe crucial systems of informal taxation involving tax-like payments (user 
fees/community development levies, chiefdom levies etc.) made in rural communities, 
outside statutory tax laws. This leads to erroneous comprehension of local household tax 
burdens, together with the dynamics of provision of local public goods, and so of governance 
in the local context (e.g. Jibao, Prichard and van den Boogaard 2017; van den Boogaard, 
Prichard and Jibao 2018).  
 
The current study, however, does not claim to have explicitly studied these informal taxes, 
mainly due to limitations in the data. Accordingly, it is crucial to clearly note that the survey 
data used in this study does not contain reliable variables on informal tax-like payments, 
which would enable a rigorous analysis of informal taxes in Nigeria. To depict informality, 
however, the paper at best provides only a simple comparative description of the size of the 
formal and the informal sector, as well as the corresponding average earnings of households 
within these sectors. This mainly comprises the proportionate mean incomes of formally and 
informally engaged individuals per specific household (see 5.1, Table 2). Further, the paper 
attempts to account for informality by failing to impose the tax rules on informal earnings, 
assuming that individuals within the informal sector (e.g. the self-employed) do not contribute 
to formal taxes. This is intentionally done to see what incidence of taxes and redistribution 
will look like in the presence of tax administration corrected for informality, relative to what 
these results will look like if informality is entirely ignored.  
 
In summary, the equity outcomes, as measured by the Kakwani Indices, reveal that the PIT 
was progressive in the pre-2011 tax scheme but turned regressive in the post-2011 tax 
scheme, after informality has been put into consideration. It was also uncovered that capping 
the relief allowance of the post-2011 tax scheme reduces the regressivity of the PIT – 
indirectly implying that the lump sum relief deductions of the current income tax scheme 
accrued more to the high-income than to the low-income taxpayers. In justification of this 
finding, the post-2011 PIT became clearly progressive when the variable part of the lump 
sum relief allowance was given to only the low-income taxpayers below a predefined income 
threshold, entirely excluding high-income taxpayers above or equal to the threshold. The 
above regressivity finding of the post-2011 income tax scheme (when the lump sum relief is 
left unrestricted) is similar to that of previous related works (e.g. Hirvonen, Mascagni and 
Roelen 2016; Mascagni, Monkam and Nell 2016), showing that tax systems initially designed 
to be progressive can still be regressive in practice. VAT was found to be regressive both in 
the pre-2020 scheme and in the current reform scheme. In terms of the redistributive effect, 
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the simulation results reveal that although the PIT marginally reduced inequality, it 
conversely increased poverty in the pre-2011 scheme. More so, the post-2011 PIT negative 
effect on inequality and positive effect on poverty was found to be minimal. The slight 
reduction in inequality as measured by the Gini index is consistent with previous works (e.g. 
Hirvonen et al. 2016), reporting a negligible effect of income taxation on overall income 
distribution. The opposing finding of reduction in inequality and increase in poverty confirms 
other studies (e.g. Lustig and Higgins 2012; Inchauste and Lustig 2017), suggesting that an 
inequality-reducing tax system could also be poverty increasing. However, if relatively high-
income taxpayers above or equal to a predefined income threshold are entirely excluded 
from sharing in the variable part of the post-2011 lump sum relief allowance, a larger 
redistributive effect is observed. The VAT in the pre-2020 scheme was uncovered to 
marginally increase inequality and poverty in Nigeria. Although the current VAT scheme 
slightly increased inequality, it considerably increased poverty – a finding similar to what Hill, 
Inchauste, Lustig, Tsehaye and Woldehanna (2017) reported for Ethiopia. It is further 
revealed that tax progressivity and the redistributive effect tend to be overestimated when 
informality is entirely assumed away (i.e. not accounted for). 
 
The current study has several limitations. First, the study is unable to directly apply the tax 
laws on informal sector earnings, since the informal sector activities evade taxes. Hence, in 
accounting for informality in PIT, the tax laws have only been directly applied on the formal 
sector earnings. Further, in an attempt to account for informality in consumption taxes, the 
study calculated and applied the effective VAT rates on taxable household consumption 
expenditures. Although this approach is in line with that of some previous studies (e.g. 
Arunatilake, Inchauste and Lustig 2017; Cancho and Bondarenko 2017; Younger and 
Khachatryan 2017), it also differs from the approach utilised in some other recent papers 
(e.g. Bachas, Gadenne and Jensen 2020). The current study shows that even when 
informality is accounted for, consumption taxes remain regressive, with little or no 
redistributive effect – a finding in line with those of Arunatilake et al. 2017 and Younger and 
Khachatryan 2017, among others). However, this finding is unlike that of Bachas et al. 2020, 
who show that accounting for the informal sector makes consumption taxes progressive. The 
varying findings could be attributable to the differing approaches used in addressing 
informality in consumption. Unlike the survey datasets containing place of purchase data, 
used by Bachas et al. 2020 to proxy informal consumption, the survey data used in the 
current study does not clearly provide information on the type of stores in which specific 
purchases occurred (making it difficult to identify informal sector purchases). This presents a 
limitation, so that the current study is only able to follow other related works in applying 
effective VAT rates in addressing consumption informality. The second limitation is that the 
study had no access to administrative data containing the real income tax amount reported 
by taxpayers. Hence, following existing studies, it obtained a proxy variable for income tax by 
applying the tax rules on formal incomes of individual households. Third, although the study 
has accounted for the quality of income variable using the consumption expenditure from the 
survey data, it still acknowledges the limitations which mainly entail that surveys exclude the 
top income earners. Also, household surveys are widely known to understate income, since 
people tend to underreport their own income during survey data collection. Hence, it is 
assumed in this study that correcting for income underreporting using ‘better’ collected 
consumption data provides a ‘better’ living standard measure for correct analyses. Fourth, 
this study has not accounted for company income tax (CIT), since there is no properly 
recorded information in the used survey to account for CIT. Hence, the main analyses in this 
work only focus on taxes (PIT and VAT) relevant to households, and not on CIT, which 
involves several uncertain assumptions, making it very difficult to ascertain the distribution of 
its final economic incidence (Ataguba 2012; Inchauste and Lustig 2017). Fifth, due to data 
limitations, this study has assumed a very simple static micro-simulation model, unable to 
study the entire fiscal system, and account for dynamic effect. It has, in a static sense, mainly 
considered the effect of two specific taxation policies (PIT and VAT), rather than the entire 
fiscal system. Despite these limitations, the study makes a useful contribution to the 
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discussion of the equity and redistribution implications of tax reforms in developing countries. 
In line with previous related studies, it specifically shows that tax systems theoretically 
designed to be progressive can still become regressive in practice. The income tax 
regressivity found in the current study is mainly attributable to the concentration of the lump 
sum relief allowance within the top of the distribution. Hence, it is revealed that placing a cap 
on relief allowance helps to reduce the regressivity of the income tax scheme. Even more 
interesting is that entirely excluding relatively high-income taxpayers above or equal to a 
predefined income threshold from sharing in the variable part of the lump sum relief 
allowance makes the post-2011 PIT clearly progressive. Consumption taxes remain 
regressive. These all together call for policy attention towards the restriction of the variable 
part of the lump sum relief allowance in the post-2011 PIT scheme and the adoption of 
differentiated VAT rates. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents a review of previous related 
literature. Section 2 describes the structure of tax revenue, together with a description of the 
key insights to the 2011 PIT Act, relative to the old PIT Act in Nigeria. Section 3 lists the 
objectives of the study. Section 4 describes the dataset and methodology – specifically 
consisting of data sources, methods for variables calculations, techniques used in accounting 
for informality and methods for calculating progressivity and the redistributive effect of PIT 
and VAT. Section 5 details the results and corresponding interpretations. Section 6 
discusses and concludes the paper. 
 
 
1  Literature review  
 
In general, there have been many studies on equity (incidence) and the redistributive effect 
of both PIT and VAT (effect on poverty and income inequality) across the globe. This ranges 
from studies conducted for developed countries (e.g. OECD countries), to works done for 
developing countries (selected low- and middle-income countries). In terms of incidence of 
PIT, most studies, aside from a few (Hirvonen et al. 2016; Mascagni et al. 2016) have 
reported this policy instrument to be progressive. For instance, Cubero and Hollar (2010) 
reported that PIT is usually progressive in Central America. In Bangladesh, Sarker (2006) 
revealed that those with higher incomes pay a larger fraction of their income in taxes, relative 
to those households with a smaller income – this implies a progressive income tax in 
Bangladesh. Nyamongo and Schoeman (2007) analysed reform in income tax progressivity 
in South Africa and found an increase in progressivity during the first phase of the reform 
programme, but a decrease in progressivity during the second phase of the reform. This they 
attributed to the fact that many more new taxpayers entered the tax net, making the 
distribution of pre-tax income more unequal. In selected OECD countries (e.g. Portugal, 
Belgium), Warren (2008) disclosed that income taxes are indeed progressive. For the 
European Union (Greece, Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, the UK), Verbist and Figari (2013) 
found that the PIT is the most crucial source of progressivity, and hence reduces income 
inequality. Supporting the above evidence, Inchauste, Lustig, Maboshe, Purfield and 
Woolard (2015) discovered a progressive income tax system in South Africa, since the richer 
deciles pay a proportionally higher share of total direct tax collections than their share of 
market income. Sarah and Kasirye (2015) also uncovered that the Uganda 2012/2013 
income tax reform enhanced the progressivity of Pay As You Earn (PAYE) in the country. 
Inchauste and Rubil (2017) report that the recent changes in income taxes (e.g. increased 
threshold for the top rate and increased personal allowance) in Croatia made the policy 
instrument more progressive in relative terms in 2017 compared to 2014, as poorer 
households paid lower taxes as a share of their incomes. Contrary to the above outcomes, 
studies such as Hirvonen et al. 2016 (for Ethiopia) and Mascagni et al. 2016 (for Rwanda) 
unpacked that tax systems initially designed to be progressive on paper can still turn to be 




Regarding the redistributive effect of PIT, while some extant studies have revealed it to 
possess negligible effect on income distribution, some other papers (e.g Martinez-Vazquez, 
Moreno-Dodson and Vulovic 2012; Inchauste et al. 2015; Du and Zhang 2018) have shown 
more significant effect. For example, Cubero and Hollar (2010) revealed that since income 
taxes contribute a marginal fraction to an already small income tax revenue across Central 
America, their overall effect on inequality is quite small. Bird and Zolt (2005) reported that 
income tax alone is not enough to redistribute income in developing countries, since it plays 
a limited role in reducing income inequality. Engel, Galetovic and Raddatz (1999) found that 
income tax has little incremental effect on the Gini coefficients in Chile, and this also holds 
even after significant modification of tax structure in the country. Contrariwise, Inchauste et 
al. (2015) found that since income taxes make up a relatively high share of the GDP, they 
contribute significantly to the gap between the rich and the poor (income inequality) in South 
Africa. Similarly, Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2012) have shown that progressive income taxes 
have a positive impact on income distribution, contributing to decreasing inequality, and this 
effect is more significant the larger the extent of progressivity and the larger the share of 
GDP that is collected from income taxes for some large panel of countries. The work of Du 
and Zhang (2018) using the generalised entropy index shows that the 2011 PIT adjustment 
in China has effectively reduced income inequality, but within the high-income group. 
Opposing this finding, Hirvonen et al. (2016) revealed that income taxation has a negligible 
effect on Ethiopia’s Gini index. In line with Hirvonen et al.’s findings, Popescu, Militaru, 
Stanila, Vasilescu and Cristescu (2019) uncovered that the PIT policy reform in Romania led 
to a modest effect on income inequality. Causa and Hermansen (2017) found for the OECD 
countries that the personal income taxes played a less important and more heterogeneous 
role in income redistribution. In Uganda, Jellema, Lustig, Haas and Wolf (2016) uncovered 
that PIT engenders a modest reduction in income inequality, whereas Inchauste and Rubil 
(2017) discovered that income taxes are significantly redistributive in Croatia.  
 
Worthy of note is that the literature provides mixed and varying evidence on the incidence 
and redistributive effect of VAT across various countries. For OECD countries (e.g. Portugal, 
Belgium), Warren (2008) reported that the VAT is regressive, though some variations exist 
across these countries. For instance, VAT in Belgium was found to be less regressive than 
VAT in Portugal. In the context of developing countries, Faridy and Sarker (2011) uncovered 
in their study in Bangladesh that VAT is regressive as it is applied at a flat rate regardless of 
the size of income of the household. In a similar developing country context, Gemmel and 
Morrissey (2005) disclosed that taxes on goods consumed especially by poor households 
are mostly regressive, whereas taxes on luxury goods, for example cars, are mostly 
progressive. In line with these findings, Cubero and Hollar (2010) have shown VAT to be 
regressive in most Central American countries. Contrary to the above regressivity findings, 
Rafaqat (2003) revealed that the incidence of goods and services tax (GST) is slightly 
progressive in Pakistan. Rafaqat attributed this progressivity outcome to the fact that most 
goods mainly consumed by poor households are excluded from GST in Pakistan. Similarly, 
Sivashankar, Rathnayake, Jayasinghe and Smith (2017) disclosed the incidence of VAT to 
be somewhat progressive in the Sri Lanka context. Toe, Diallo, Barhoumi, Towfighian and 
Maino (2017) uncovered in Benin that VAT is progressively distributed, since richer 
households account for larger VAT shares. More recently, Bachas et al. (2020) revealed 
through their work that accounting for the informal sector makes consumption taxes 
progressive in some selected developing economies. For the Dominican Republic, Jenkins, 
Jenkins and Kuo (2006) also found that VAT is progressive, and that this is so even when the 
base of the VAT is made more comprehensive. In other words, wealthy households pay 
effective VAT rates that are on average 2.5 times higher than the rates faced by poor 
households. In mixed findings, Sarah and Kasirye (2015) show that, in Uganda, when the 
VAT base is broadened, it becomes progressive for certain goods (e.g. milk), regressive for 
other goods such as salt and inconclusive for some others such as processed corn. In a 
more recent study, Thomas (2020) revealed a small extent of progressivity in nearly all 
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selected OECD countries, with the exception of countries such as Chile, Hungary, Latvia and 
New Zealand involving a negligible proportion of regressivity. 
 
In terms of the redistributive effectiveness of VAT, the current study observed mixed 
outcomes as well. While some existing studies (e.g. Cubero and Hollar 2010; Toe et al. 
2017) report a significant redistribution from the VAT policy instrument, others such as Engel 
et al. 1999, Schmutz and Schaltegger 2018 and Thomas 2020 disclose a less significant 
effect. For instance, in Chile, Engel et al. (1999) found that a significant increase in VAT from 
18 per cent to 25 per cent resulted in an insignificant effect on after-tax income distribution. 
Inchauste and Rubil (2017) used a simulation approach to show that in Croatia reducing the 
statutory VAT rate from 25 per cent to 24 per cent would negligibly reduce inequality but 
would bring down poverty by 0.21 per cent. Phillips, Warwick, Goldman, Goraus, Inchauste, 
Harris and Jellema (2018) uncovered that although low VAT rates on commodities, such as 
foodstuffs and kerosene, reduce poverty, they are not properly directed towards the poorer 
households in selected low- and middle-income countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal and 
Zambia). Toe et al. (2017) show that in Benin, although VAT reduces income inequality, it 
contributes to an increase in the poverty headcount rate. Cubero and Hollar (2010) report 
that since VAT is an important source of revenue in most Central American countries, its 
effect on inequality is significant. Similarly, Blasco, Guillaud and Zemmour (2020) recently 
found that taxes for consumption produce a reasonable rise in the Gini index (ranging from 
0.01 to roughly 0.05 points) for a panel of selected countries (Australia, France, Germany, 
Ireland, United Kingdom and United States). They also concluded that variation across 
countries in the consumption tax redistributive effect are majorly defined by varying tax rates 
(ranging 7 per cent to 30 per cent). Opposing the first finding of Blasco et al., Schmutz and 
Schaltegger (2018) used Swiss data to uncover that the current VAT rate has no significant 
redistributive effects on income inequality. But they also reveal that differentiated VAT rates 
have some redistributive impact, since households in the higher deciles of consumption 
expenditures have, on average, a larger share of expenditures taxed at normal VAT rate, 
relative to households in the lower deciles. For some 27 OECD countries, Thomas (2020) 
revealed the VAT to possess a minimal redistributive effect, and this comes from the minute 
extent of progressivity of the tax instrument. Notably, the results of Blasco et al. (2020) also 
revealed that VAT raises the number of people below the line of poverty. 
 
Although the incidence and redistributive effect of PIT and VAT have been well studied 
across several developed and developing countries, these issues have not been sufficiently 
addressed in certain low- and middle-income countries – particularly the context of Nigeria. 
As noted above, related studies in Nigeria (e.g. Egbon and Mgbame 2015) are merely a 
conceptual analysis of only the incidence of PIT. Some others (e.g. Anyaduba and Otulugbu 
2019) which are also partial analyses have only used macro (aggregate) data which is not 
able to specifically point to individual household taxes and their particular effects on welfare 
at the micro household level. Hence, the motivation for the current study to fill these gaps.  
 
 
2  Structure of tax revenue in Nigeria  
 
Table 1 below gives a breakdown of the major Nigerian government tax revenue sources, 
and also identifies specific tax components that were included in the incidence analyses. 
Overall, Nigeria tax revenue as a share of GDP within the 2018 period was only 6.3 per cent. 
This is 10.2 percentage points below the African (30 countries) average tax-to-GDP ratio of 
16.5 per cent, and also 16.8 percentage points below the Latin American/Caribbean average 
values within same period respectively (OECD/AUC/ATAF 2020). Of Nigeria’s total tax 
revenue in 2018, direct taxes contributed the largest share of roughly 60 per cent, with the 
bulk of the share (about 50 per cent) coming from corporate income taxes. This was followed 
by the total indirect tax proportion of 25 per cent, with the major part of it collected from the 
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value added taxes (roughly 14 per cent). The incidence and redistributive analyses in this 
paper focus on PIT and VAT, covering about 24 per cent of the total tax revenue collections. 
These are the main direct and indirect taxes, of which their respective burdens are readily 
identifiable to specific households. Other direct (corporate taxes) and indirect taxes (e.g. 
excise and custom taxes) as seen in Table 1 below have been excluded from the analyses 
following difficulty in attributing the respective taxes to particular households using the 
Nigeria survey data. Finally, aside from the corporate income taxes and value added taxes 
contributing 3.2 per cent and roughly 1 per cent shares to the GDP, other tax components 
individually contribute less than 1 per cent share to the Nigeria GDP in the 2018 period.  
 
Table 1 Structure of tax revenue in Nigeria, 2018 
Revenue source Total (N’ million) Share of total 
taxes (%) 
Share of GDP 
(%) 
IA? 
Total tax revenue 8,167,037 100 6.3 No 
Indirect taxes  2,047,860 25.1 1.6 No 
Value added tax 1,108,040 13.6 0.9 Yes 
Excise taxes 55,060 0.7 0.04 No 
Custom and import taxes 884,760 10.8 0.7 No 
Direct taxes 4,910,260 60.1 3.8 No 
Personal income tax  798,630 9.8 0.6 Yes 
Corporate income tax  4,111,631 50.3 3.2 No 
Social security contributions 687,080 8.4 0.5 No 
Other taxes  521,837 6.4 0.4 No 
Source: Author’s calculation based on macroeconomic data from the Nigeria Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS). Currently, 
the Nigeria 2018 macro tax revenue composition data is the latest available, detailed and most reliable from the FIRS.  
Notes: 1 N = Nigeria Naira. IA? = included in incidence analyses? 
2 Social security contributions mainly comprise both employees’ and employers’ national pension commission and national 
health insurance varying contributions. 
3 Other taxes mainly comprise taxes on goods and services other than VAT. 
 
2.1 Key insights to the 2011 PIT Act, relative to the old PIT Act 
 
Below, the study examines salient changes in the 2011 PIT Act, relative to the old PIT Act. 
 
The Personal Income Tax (PIT) Act No. 104 of 1993 was the principal act regulating the PIT 
administration in Nigeria until it was altered as the PIT Act, Cap. P8 Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria (LFN) 2004, and subsequently amended in 2011 as the PIT (Amendment) Act 
2011. The principal act (pre-2011) states some several separate personal allowable 
allowances (tax reliefs), which include housing, meals, utilities and other things. But these 
reliefs were all merged into one in the 2011 Act. For instance, the principle act states that 
‘Tax shall be payable for each year of assessment on the aggregate amounts of income of 
every taxable person, for the year, other than the following allowances: rent allowance paid 
by the employer to the employee not exceeding ₦100,000 per year; transport allowance of 
the employee not exceeding ₦15,000 per year; meal allowance of a maximum of ₦5,000 per 
year; utility allowance of ₦10,000 per annum; and entertainment allowance of ₦6,000 per 
annum’. However, these separate allowances were abolished and updated in the amended 
2011 Act and brought together as one consolidated relief allowance in the computation of the 
tax liability of an employee (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1993, 2011). 
 
By section 33 of the principal act, an employee is also granted a personal tax relief or 
allowance of ₦5,000 plus 20 per cent of earned income. But the 2011 act consolidates all 
these allowances and reliefs to mainly include ₦200,000 plus 20 per cent of gross income. 
Gross income (or emolument) is defined to comprise in-kind benefits and any other income 
derived solely from employment. Thereafter, the following deductions are tax exempt under 
the 2011 act: national housing fund (NHF), national health insurance scheme (NHIS), life 
assurance premium (LAP), and national pension allowance. After these deductions are 
15 
 
made; the remaining balance is taxable in accordance with the new tax table (see Table 10 
in the appendix). Notably, the current study has only accounted for the national pension 
allowance – 8 per cent of income in addition to ₦200,000 plus 20 per cent of income 
(applicable to roughly all Nigerian employees both in the government and private sectors) in 
the computation of the amount of tax payable in the post-2011 scheme. This is simply 
because, in reality, deductions such as the NHF, NHIS, and LAP are not usually applicable 
across all workers. As observed from selected workers’ pay slips, for instance, some federal 
government workers contribute to NHF, but this is not quite applicable to government 
workers across all levels and most workers in the private sectors. And it is unlikely that the 
tax authorities will grant these allowances (NHF, NHIS, and LAP) (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) 2012).  
 
Further, the 2011 act increased the minimum tax rate payable by an employee from 0.5 per 
cent to 1 per cent of the gross income below the minimum taxable income per annum. The 
graduated rate of income tax is adjusted as follows; the first and last incomes to be taxed in 
the pre-2011 act are ₦20,000 and ₦120,000 at corresponding rates of 5 per cent and 25 per 
cent respectively. However, these were adjusted in the 2011 act to include: the first and last 
income to be taxed as ₦300,000 and ₦3,200,000 at corresponding rates of 7 per cent and 24 
per cent respectively (PIT Act 1993; PIT (Amendment) Act 2011). For detailed breakdown of 
these income tax bands and corresponding rates see tables 9 and 10 in the appendix. As 
noted in the introduction above, the 2011 reforms were designed to reduce the income tax 
burden of all individuals, mainly the poor people in line with the national tax policy objective 
of reduction in the burden of direct tax in the country (PwC 2012). 
 
 
3  Research objectives 
  
The broad aim of this research is to assess the equity and redistributive effects of taxation 
reforms in Nigeria. Specific objectives include: 
 
1. To assess the progressivity of income tax and value added tax reforms in Nigeria. 
2. To assess the distributional effect of income tax and value added tax reforms in Nigeria. 
This second objective is specifically further broken down into: 
i. To estimate the effect of income tax and value added tax reforms on poverty levels 
in Nigeria. 
ii. To estimate the effect of income tax and value added tax reforms on income 
inequality in Nigeria.   
 
 
4  Data and methodology  
 
4.1 Data sources  
 
The study will mainly use the most recent large scale nationally representative survey 
dataset (i.e. the Nigeria Living Standard Survey (NLSS) 2018/2019) with detailed income and 
expenditure information. The NLSS is representative of the 36 states in Nigeria and Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, with its sample covering around 22,110 households. The 
survey covers a wide and diverse set of socio-economic and demographic data concerning 
basic needs and the conditions under which households live on a day-to-day basis. It is 
collected through two major different survey questionnaires. These are the household and 
the community questionnaires. The current study utilised information from the household 
questionnaire. The household questionnaire provided information on demographics; 
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education; health; labour; food and non-food expenditure; household non-farm income 
generating activities; food security and shocks; safety nets; housing conditions; assets; 
information and communication technology; agriculture and land tenure; and other sources of 
household income. In terms of the sample size determination, 60 enumeration areas (EAs) 
were selected per state with ten sampled households per EA. This resulted in an initial 
sample of 600 households per state and an overall sample size of 22,110 households. The 
survey is produced by the Nigeria NBS with technical assistance from the World Bank. 
Financial support for the survey came from the Federal Government of Nigeria, the World 
Bank, and the National Social Safety-Net Coordinating Office (NASSCO).4  
 
4.2 Variables calculations (computing taxes, and adjusting for income 
underreporting)  
 
First, the tax information is not directly reported in the NLSS, so the study cannot use the 
‘Direct Identification Method’ to directly obtain the taxes. Hence, as suggested in Lustig and 
Higgins 2012, the current study used the ‘Simulation Method’ i.e. it calculated the taxes (PIT 
and VAT) from available information in the survey (income and consumption expenditure 
data), assuming that the economic burden of PIT and VAT is borne by the income earner 
and the consumers in line with conventional tax incidence analyses. Second, the survey 
contains a detailed income module that attempts to measure household income as correctly 
as possible. However, in measuring the living standard of the household, consumption 
expenditure has been widely noted to be easier to collect in household surveys, less prone to 
fluctuations, and as a result more reliable than household income (Deaton and Zaidi 2002). 
More so, household surveys have a tendency of under-computing incomes, because people 
might on purpose or by accident underreport their own incomes, surveys might fail to ask 
sufficient questions to capture certain categories of income, and on the whole miss top 
income earners in the society (Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2011). Consequently, income is 
measured with significant error, and failing to adjust for income underreporting in the current 
study involving the imputation of income taxes to households by applying the prevailing tax 
laws would lead to underestimation of the incidence and redistributive effect of the PIT. 
Hence, this makes its direct use in this study less appealing.  
 
In this study, however, using consumption data directly poses a significant challenge, since 
the tax simulation requires applying tax rates on wage income component alone. That is, out 
of other income components, the proportion of labour income in total consumption will be 
determined. In Nigeria, for instance, income taxes are mainly paid by employees in the 
formal sector, so that PIT is calculated separately based on the PAYE system for paid 
employment, rather than being applied to the aggregate income components. Hence, to 
attempt to deal with this issue, the study followed Hirvonen et al. 2016 to use the following 
steps. First, this study calculated the shares of household total income coming from different 
income sources (agricultural and labour wages, crop income, livestock income, income from 
self-employment, and other income (e.g. income received from land and non-land assets)). 
Second, it multiplied these shares by the total consumption of the household, dividing the 
household consumption into the income components. Finally, it applied tax rates on the 
labour wage component before re-computing the total household consumption variable. By 
following this process, however, the work might judge too highly the total tax payments for 
households that have more than one wage earner. However, it is crucial to note that the 
majority of households in the data have only one wage earner. By taxing incomes at the 
household level together, rather than separately, the study applied higher marginal rates on 
relatively high incomes. To account for household size, this work utilised per capita measure 
in adjusting aggregate consumption.5  
 
4  The 2018/2019 NLSS dataset can be accessed through the following link: 
http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3827 
5  Consumption aggregate should be adjusted to account for household size, using per capita or equivalence scale 
measure. The current study chose per capita estimate, since it is mostly commonly available and because the existence 
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4.3 Accounting for informality in PIT and VAT 
 
Informality in payment of personal income tax was accounted for by following existing related 
studies (e.g. Younger and Khachatryan 2017; Cancho and Bondarenko 2017) to assume that 
only formal sector employees pay taxes, while self-employed individuals and employees of 
the informal sector do not pay taxes. Indeed, this is applicable to Nigeria, where individual 
income taxes are assumed to be mainly paid and borne by labour in the formal sector 
(Adekanola 1997). This implies that informal sector workers tend to dodge income taxes and 
hence may not share in the burden. In Nigeria, taxes are mainly paid by employees in the 
formal sector, since there are records, and they are deducted from the source (Adekanola 
1997). The self-employed jobs that tend to evade taxes in the country mainly comprise 
activities in the informal sector. These activities, as defined in section 9 (non-farm enterprises 
and income generating activities) of the household questionnaire comprise carwash, metal 
worker, mechanic, carpenter, tailor, barber, hawking or selling anything on the street, bar, 
and food stand businesses etc. Because these activities are likely to evade taxes, this study 
did not apply the tax rules on them, instead, it applied taxes on the labour income of formally 
employed individuals. This enabled us not to overestimate the income tax effect in Nigeria.  
 
In terms of value added tax, informality also exists (i.e. evasion on payment of VAT). 
Purchases in rural areas and informal sector establishments (markets) are more likely to 
evade tax. VAT evasion can either be modelled by assuming that those who purchase goods 
in certain areas are tax evaders, or by assuming effective VAT rates that reflect rates paid in 
reality, instead of statutory rates which can overestimate the impact of indirect taxes on 
income (Rajemison, Haggblade and Younger 2003). However, there is a lack of quality data 
on places of purchase of consumption items. In other words, it is not possible for the study to 
know from the NLSS data whether a household bought something from a business firm that 
pays VAT or not. Moreover, prices at firms that do not pay VAT are likely the same as those 
that do pay VAT, with the benefits of non-payment going to the owners of the firm. This 
implies that households suffer the burden of the tax regardless of the tax status of the seller 
(Arunatilake et al. 2017). Hence, to account for informality and evasion of value added tax, 
this study followed related papers (e.g. Jellema, Wai-Poi and Afkar 2017; Arunatilake et al. 
2017; Younger and Khachatryan 2017) to apply an effective VAT rate (rather than the 
statutory rate) to all household purchases excluding exempt goods. The effective rate of the 
VAT was calculated as the ratio of total VAT revenue collections to the total consumption 
value of all goods subject to VAT (the taxable base). The proportion of VAT was then 
estimated by applying the effective rate to household expenditures, excluding the exemptions 
provided by the tax code. Although this approach is in line with that of the previously 
mentioned studies, it also differs from the approach utilised in some other recent papers (e.g. 
Bachas et al. 2020). Unlike the survey datasets containing place of purchase used in Bachas 
et al. to proxy informal consumption, the survey data used in the current study does not 
clearly provide information on the type of stores in which specific purchases occurred 
(making it difficult to identify informal sector purchases). This presents a limitation, so that the 
current study is only able to follow other related works in using effective VAT rates in 
addressing the consumption informality issue. 
 
4.4 Method to assess the progressivity of PIT and VAT 
 
To measure the progressivity of PIT and VAT, the study utilised the Kakwani Indices relevant 
in financing incidence analysis, which have been applied in several related studies (e.g. 
Lustig, Pessino and Scott 2013; Inchauste et al. 2015). The Kakwani Index helps to reveal 
whether a given tax financing tool is progressive, regressive or proportional relative to ability 
to pay (i.e. income). Of importance to mention is that there are various methods in the 
 
of many different equivalence scales weakens comparability of estimates (see United Nations University World Institute 
for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 2021). 
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literature for assessing progressivity. The easiest approach employed by some authors 
involves the comparison of various quantile proportions of income spent on payments (tax) to 
try to get at progressivity (Lyon and Schwab 1995). This begins by categorising households 
into quantiles (e.g. quintiles, deciles). For each share of the quantiles, income spent on taxes 
is computed. Progressivity is then determined by considering how the ratios (analogue of 
average tax rate) vary across quantiles. This method, however, has some limitations. First, it 
is not sensitive to changes that may occur close to the cut-off points for categorising 
households. Second, it does not show a complete picture of how the ratio of tax payments to 
income vary across the entire income distribution, and the precise magnitude of progressivity 
cannot be obtained simply by looking at these ratios (Musgrave and Thin 1948; Kakwani 
1977). In response to these limitations, some more formal indices and curves in the form of 
the Lorenz curve, Gini index, concentration curves and indices have been developed and 
used in the appraisal of progressivity. Another is the Musgrave and Thin index, which simply 
compares inequality in pre-payment income with that of post-payment income (Musgrave 
and Thin 1948). However, this method has been criticised on the grounds that it mainly 
measures redistributive effects, instead of pure progressivity (Kakwani 1977). More so, this 
method is not invariant to scaling payment rates by a constant positive scalar. For instance, 
when all payments are increased by a given J per cent, progressivity increases. Kakwani 
noted that this process is not consistent with the definition of progressivity (i.e. a relative 
measure as opposed to an absolute measure). A measure of progressivity should not 
capture this effect because it measures deviations from proportionality (Kakwani 1977). As a 
result, the application of the Musgrave and Thin method in present day empirical usage has 
been limited. Hence, to deal with these limitations, Kakwani proposed an index for assessing 
progressivity. The Kakwani Index, which has become widely used in public economics, 
compares the concentration curve of tax payments with the Lorenz curve of pre-payment 
income. 
 
To follow up on informality, the study provides estimates of Kakwani Index both without 
(formal plus informal incomes) and with informal sector correction (formal income taken 
alone) to enable comparison. For the incidence of income taxes, the study applied the 
income tax table to both the formal and informal incomes, computed their corresponding 
taxes, and then added them together. It then applied the added total taxes in the incidence 
analyses. Note that this is intentionally done, in order not to differentiate the effect of formal 
and informal incomes in the initial instance. Then, to enable comparison, the study accounts 
for informality by repeating the incidence analyses using taxes computed from only the 
formal incomes, ignoring the informal incomes. In terms of the VAT, the study has also 
presented incidence estimates both without informal sector (using statutory rate), and with 
informal sector correction (by applying effective rate) so as to enable comparison between 
the two. 
 
4.5 Method to assess the redistributive effect of PIT and VAT 
 
Progressivity analyses reveal the extent to which tax payments deviate from proportionality, 
but do not reveal how the distribution of income and poverty is affected by this deviation. The 
distributional effect of tax payments is mainly measured through the redistributive effect 
analysis. For instance, the redistributive effect quantifies how much more unequal (or equal) 
tax payments make the distribution of income (Ataguba 2012). Initially, the study aimed to 
use the Duclos, Jalbert and Araar (DJA) (2003) decomposition method in carrying out the 
distributional effect of tax payments. However, this method presents some challenges, one of 
which is that it requires some normative choice of values of parameter of aversion to re-
ranking inequality (change in the order of distribution), and parameter of aversion to 
horizontal inequality (increase in overall income inequality resulting from unequal treatment 
of equals) (Duclos et al. 2003). Further, it is only based on inequality measure. This implies 
that it mainly examines only the income redistributive effect of tax payments (effect of taxes 
on income inequality alone) (Ataguba 2012) and is unable to account for its effect on poverty 
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levels. This is a crucial aspect, as a tax system could decrease inequality but still lead to 
higher poverty levels (Inchauste and Rubil 2017). Hence, to analyse the effect of tax 
payments (income tax and VAT) on both inequality and poverty, the current study follows 
extant literature (e.g. Inchauste et al. 2015; Hirvonen et al., 2016; Inchauste and Rubil 2017) 
to use basic incidence analysis by constructing a simple static micro-simulation model.  
 
The redistributive analysis using the micro-simulation model involved the computation of the 
inequality and poverty measures using total income/consumption variables adjusted for 
PIT/VAT. To adjust total income for PIT, the study first selected from the survey the taxable 
income components (i.e. wage/labour income). Next, it applied appropriate tax rates on this 
income component to get net wage income. Next, it recalculated the total incomes by adding 
the net wage incomes to the other non-adjusted income components (agricultural wages, 
crop income, and livestock income) in the survey. The final step involved the recalculation of 
the inequality and poverty measures using the new income total. Adjusting consumption 
aggregate for VAT followed a similar process. The study first selected and added up the 
vatable items from appropriate sections of the household survey. Next, it applied the VAT 
rate on the sum of the vatable items, so as to get the value of these items. Next, it 
recalculated the consumption aggregate by adding the net vatable items’ value to the other 
unadjusted items (i.e. the items that are VAT exempt). The final step consisted of the 
recalculation of the inequality and poverty measures using the new consumption aggregate. 
The details of the micro-simulation method are provided below. 
 
To simulate the poverty and inequality effects of taxation reforms, six simple micro equations 
were estimated. The first three simple equations are: total income for the base scenario; total 
income adjusted for the pre-2011 income tax scenario; and total income adjusted for the 
post-2011 income tax scenario. The second three simple equations are: total consumption 
for the base scenario; total consumption adjusted for the pre-2020 value added tax scenario; 
and total consumption adjusted for the 2020 value added tax scenario. These are detailed 
below. 
 
Base income tax scenario: 
Total income in the base scenario (totinc) is formed of labour wage (labour), crop income 
(crop), livestock income (livestock), fishing income (fishing), self-employment income (self-
employment), transfer income (transfer) and other income (other). This is described below 
as: 
 
totinc = labour + crop + livestock + fishing + self-employment + transfer + other   (1) 
 
Pre-2011 income tax scenario: 
This scenario involves the analysis of redistribution using the pre-2011 income tax structure 
(see Table 9 in the appendix). The study applied the tax structure on the labour wages alone 
(in accounting for informality) and on both the labour wages and self-employment income (in 
ignoring the existence of the informal sector). Hence, the labour and self-employment 
variables in equation 1 above become net labour and net self-employment as described in 
equation 2 below:   
 
totinc(n1) = netlabour(n1) + crop + livestock + fishing + netself-employment(n1) + transfer + 
other            (2) 
 
Where: totinc(n1) is the total income after taxes under the pre-2011 income tax structure, 
whereas netlabour(n1) and netself-employment(n1) are labour wage and total self-






Post-2011 income tax scenario: 
This scenario involves the analysis of redistribution based on the post-2011 income tax 
structure (see Table 10 in the appendix). The study applied the tax structure on labour wages 
alone (in accounting for informality), and both the labour wages and total self-employment 
income (in ignoring the informality effect) as in equation 3 below: 
 
totinc(n2) = netlabour(n2) + crop + livestock + fishing + netself-employment(n2) + transfer + 
other            (3) 
 
Where: totinc(n2) is the total income after taxes under the post-2011 income tax structure, 
whereas netlabour(n2) and netself-employment(n2) are labour wage and total self-
employment income after taxes based on the post-2011 income tax structure, respectively.  
 
Base VAT scenario: 
Total consumption in the base scenario (totcons) is formed of vatable items (vatable), non-
vatable items (nonvatable), other non-food items (nonfood), and total food items (food). Note 
that this computation still gives the same value as the totalcons data in the survey, since 
above mentioned components form total household consumption. The total consumption for 
the base scenario is stated below as: 
 
totcons = vatable + nonvatable + nonfood + food      (4) 
 
Pre-2020 VAT scenario: 
This scenario involves the analysis of redistribution using the pre-2020 VAT rate of 5 per cent 
(2.5 per cent effective rate). The study applied the 2.5 per cent effective rate on vatable 
items. Hence, the vatable variable in equation 4 above becomes netvatable(n1) as described 
in equation 5 below:   
 
totcons(n1) = netvatable(n1) + nonvatable + nonfood + food    (5) 
 
Where: totcons(n1) is the total consumption after VAT using the pre-2020 VAT rate, whereas 
netvatable(n1) is vatable items after VAT proportion is subtracted. This is based on the pre-
2020 VAT rate.  
 
2020 VAT scenario: 
This scenario involves the analysis of redistribution using the recent 2020 VAT rate of 7.5 per 
cent (3.8 per cent effective rate). The study applied the 3.8 per cent effective tax rate (ETR) 
on vatable items. Hence, the vatable variable in equation 4 above becomes netvatable(n2) as 
described in equation 6 below:   
 
totcons(n2) = netvatable(n2) + nonvatable + nonfood + food    (6) 
 
Where: totcons(n2) is the total consumption after VAT using the 2020 VAT rate, whereas 
netvatable(n2) is vatable items after VAT using the 2020 VAT rate.  
 
Further, the redistributive effect was measured through inequality (Gini coefficient) and 
poverty measures (poverty headcount, gap and severity).6 The Gini coefficient, a very useful 
measure of inequality in a distribution, calculates the difference between all income pairs in 
the data, and the total of all absolute differences. This total is then normalised by dividing it 
by the population squared times the mean income. The Gini index scales between zero and 
one. Zero indicates perfect equality, and one measures perfect inequality. The study also 
uses the Lorenz curve to present the overall income inequality. Graphically, the Lorenz curve 
 
6  The poverty and inequality (Gini coefficient) measures were calculated using the user-written ‘egen_inequal’ (Lokshin 
and Sajaia 2006) and ‘fastgini’ (Sajaia 2007) routines in Stata 14 respectively.  
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consists of a vertical axis that represents cumulative income shares and a horizontal axis 
that measures the cumulative population. A 45-degree line in this graph represents perfect 
equality (similar to the Gini coefficient equals to zero). Contrariwise, if the Lorenz curve lies 
flat over the horizontal axis until the last person and vertical for the last person in the 
population, then we have the line of perfect inequality (i.e., the Gini coefficient equals one). In 
other words, the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient are inter-linked. Simply put, the Gini 
index is twice the area between the line of equality (45-degree line) and the Lorenz curve. 
The demerit of the Gini coefficient is that it only measures overall inequality within the 
country. However, policy makers in low- and middle-income countries are often more 
interested in the poorest section of the society. Consequently, this study is motivated to also 
simulate effects of taxes on poverty. To achieve this, the paper utilised the Foster, Greer, 
and Thorbecke (FGT) (1984) class of poverty (indices) measures, comprising of the poverty 
head count index, poverty gap index, and the poverty severity index. The poverty head count 
indicates the share of people that are under the poverty line. The poverty gap estimates the 
total poverty shortfall of the poor as compared to the line of poverty. Finally, the poverty 
severity indicates the squared proportional shortfall from the poverty line. This is based on 
how the poverty line is determined in the country.7 This basis correctly fits the current study, 
since the NLSS used as the source of data was initially designed to accurately measure 
poverty in Nigeria.8  
 
In the redistributive effect estimates, the study also followed up on informality. It also 
provided results of the micro-simulation both with and without informal sector correction to 
ease comparison. For the redistributive effect of income taxes, the study applied the income 
tax table to both the formal and informal incomes, calculated their corresponding taxes, and 
then added them together. It then applied the added total taxes to measure their 
redistributive effects. Note that this was intentionally done, in order to ignore the separated 
effect of formal and informal incomes. Further, to make comparison possible, the study then 
accounted for informality by repeating the redistributive analyses using taxes computed from 
only the formal incomes, ignoring the informal incomes. In terms of the VAT, the study also 
presented comparative redistributive estimates by differently applying the statutory rates and 
effective rates. Of importance to note here is that the study attempts to provide a 
comparative descriptive analysis of the size of the formal and the informal sector, together 
with their corresponding average earnings, comprising proportionate mean incomes of 
formally employed and informally engaged individuals per household (see Table 2).    
 
4.6 Micro-simulation of the relief allowance structure in the 2011 PIT Act 
 
To shed more light on the redistributive effect of PIT, this section employs the static micro-
simulation technique to capture how the pre-tax income distribution changes when the legally 
mandated lump sum relief allowance (deductions) in the current PIT scheme is 
modified/regulated. This subsection aims to test the extent of change that will occur in 
progressivity and redistribution when lump sum relief allowance in the post-2011 PIT is 
regulated. Drawing on the micro-level data for each individual household, the study simulates 
the lump sum relief allowance regulations for four varying counterfactual scenarios. 
 
In scenario one, the study only capped the fixed part of the relief allowance at ₦100,000, 
without altering the variable part. In scenario two, the study capped both the variable and the 
fixed parts of the relief at 10 per cent and ₦100,000 respectively. In scenario three, the study 
gave the variable part of the lump sum relief allowance to only the low-income taxpayers 
below a predefined income threshold, entirely excluding high-income taxpayers, and then 
 
7  In Nigeria, the official poverty line is based on the ‘cost of basic needs approach’ referred to as the monetary value of 
food and non-food expenditures needed for an individual to achieve a basic level of welfare (NBS 2020). Currently, this 
total monetary value for Nigeria equal 137,430 Naira (NLSS 2018/2019). This value has been utilised in calculating 
poverty in this study.  
8  The NLSS is the official survey that serves as the basis for measuring poverty and living standards in Nigeria. 
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gave the fixed part of the relief to all taxpayers. In scenario four, the fixed component was 
given to all taxpayers plus the variable part. But the variable part was multiplied by a certain 
predetermined (fixed) amount. Hence, the variable part did not grow beyond the 
predetermined level. Next, the statutory tax rates and tax tables were employed to simulate 
the new tax liabilities and after-tax income for each individual household under the varying 
scenarios. Finally, the progressivity and redistributive effect were calculated using the PIT 
modified in line with the predesigned counterfactual scenarios. The baseline and simulated 
scenarios were calculated as follows:  
 
Baseline scenario: The variable and fixed parts of the lump sum relief allowance (CRA) 
without cap. This is accounted for using , where  is gross income and  refers to 
income tax liabilities.  
 
Scenario one: The fixed part of the CRA is capped at ₦100,000. This is accounted for as 
, where  is gross income and  refers to simulated tax liabilities when only the 
fixed part of the relief allowance is capped at ₦100,000.  
 
Scenario two: The variable and fixed parts of the CRA are capped at 10 per cent and 
₦100,000 respectively. To account for this, the study uses , where  is gross income 
and  refers to simulated tax liabilities when variable and fixed parts of the CRA are capped 
at 10 per cent and ₦100,000 respectively.  
 
Scenario three: All the variable components (20 per cent + 8 per cent) were provided only 
for income taxpayers below a predefined income threshold (₦314,000), excluding taxpayers 
above or equal to this threshold (see more details below). Then the fixed component 
(₦200,000) was given to all income taxpayers. Note that the individual households above or 
equal to this predefined income threshold are the high-income taxpayers who do not get the 
variable component at all. To account for this, the study uses , where  is gross 
income and  refer to simulated tax liabilities when all the variable parts are provided to only 
income taxpayers below the predefined income threshold and the fixed part is provided to all 
income taxpayers. Section 4.6.1 below provides more details on the determination of the 
eligibility standard. 
 
Scenario four: This is an alternative to scenario three above. Analysis of this scenario 
shows that it yields results very similar to scenario three above. Consequently, the study has 
intentionally not disclosed its corresponding outcomes in the result section – for the sake of 
conciseness.9 Here, the fixed component is given to all income taxpayers plus the variable 
part (28 per cent) of a certain small fixed amount. That is, the variable part is multiplied by a 
given predetermined amount, so that its variable nature is completely constrained within a 
predetermined level. Here, the study fixed the certain amount to 28 per cent times the value 
of the predefined income threshold in scenario three. Hence, both the low- and high-income 
taxpayers take share in the fixed and variable relief components, but as previously 
mentioned the variable part of the relief is restricted from growing beyond the predefined 
income threshold.  
 
4.6.1 Defining eligibility criterion for lump sum relief allowance distribution across 
individual households in the middle/low-income category  
 
To define a threshold that will enable the proper distribution of the variable part of the lump 
sum relief allowance across low-income taxpayers, this study divided the income distribution 
into deciles (10 income groups – ranging from the top to the bottom 10 per cent). The desired 
threshold should enable the allocation of the variable part of the lump sum relief allowance to 
 
9  The results of scenario four are available upon request. 
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only low-income taxpayers from the middle to the lowest income decile, entirely excluding 
income taxpayers above the middle to the highest income decile. Hence, the study selected 
the income (₦314,000) of least taxpayer in the top 60 per cent of the income distribution to 
serve as the guiding threshold. This means that any taxpayer whose income is below this 
threshold is within the middle (bottom 50 per cent) and the lowest (bottom 10 per cent) 
income category (i.e. within the lowest 50 per cent of the income distribution). Hence, the 
eligibility standard is that any individual household within this lowest 50 per cent of the 
income distribution is defined as a low-income taxpayer and automatically qualified to receive 
the variable part of the relief allowance. On the contrary, any individual household within the 
top 60 per cent (from the least household in the top 60 per cent to the number one household 
in the top 10 per cent) of the income distribution is defined as a high-income taxpayer and 
hence, entirely disqualified from receiving this variable portion of the relief allowance. Note 
that the fixed part of the allowance is then distributed to all income taxpayers. 
 
The methodology described in the subsection above was then employed to calculate 
inequality, poverty, progressivity and redistribution indicators in line with these predesigned 
counterfactual scenarios.  
 
 
5  Results  
 
5.1 Economic activities and earnings of the average Nigerian household 
 
This subsection presents the various labour activities in which Nigerian households 
participate, together with their corresponding annual average incomes. 
 
Table 2 Household economic activities, with corresponding average income shares 
First 
part 
Economic activities (% of sampled households)  
Strata Wage employment Farming Self-employment Apprenticeship No activity 
Nigeria  8.61 33.64 18.22 2.58 36.91 
Urban 43.16 11.28 33.61 46.97 27.47 
Rural 56.84 88.72 64.39 53.03 72.53 
Second 
part 
Annual average incomes of formally and informally employed Nigeria households  
Nigeria 802,127 73,165 912,863 n/a n/a 
Urban 944,851 39,728 1,263,509 n/a n/a 
Rural 691,790 88,059 715,273 n/a n/a 
Note: 1 In the first part of the table, the results for each activity is in % of total households in all activities in the survey.  
2 Urban or rural activity in the same first part of the table is in % of total households in each corresponding activity. 
3 n/a = not available. In other words, apprenticeship earnings are not reported, and of course people with no activity have no 
incomes in the survey data. 
4 Annual average incomes in the above table are reported in 000’ Nigeria Naira. 
 
From Table 2, wage employment with about 9 per cent of the total survey sample is lowest in 
share of economic participation after the share of apprenticeship10 (about 3 per cent). As 
reported in the survey interviewer manual, this wage employment is the main wage job of the 
individual11 and hence excludes any other activity involving self-employment12 and any farm 
 
10  Apprenticeship relates to individuals working with a craft or trade expert within a set period to develop their skills. This 
activity could be paid or unpaid. 
11  In fact, the labour part of the survey data has reported monetary payment coming from only this main wage job. 
12  Self-employment is defined in the survey interviewer manual to mainly involve informal activities comprising of 
carpentry, hairdressing, shop keeping, or making and selling of food that takes place within or outside the home, village 
market, roadside or in the streets. The monetary reward from self-employment is reported separately in the non-farm 
enterprise section of the survey data. 
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or agricultural related activities.13 The current study in accounting for the informal sector has 
applied the graduated income tax table only on the main wage job activity. As seen in Table 
2, households temporarily in no income related activity take the largest share – 37 per cent14 
followed by the households involved in farming and self-employment activities with about 34 
per cent and 18 per cent shares respectively. In terms of sector (urban-rural) division in the 
above table, farming activity reveals the largest share (89 per cent) in rural areas, followed 
by ‘no activity’ with about 73 per cent of its households in the rural areas. This high 
concentration in the rural areas is not surprising since farmers and individuals with no jobs 
are easily found in the rural part of the country. Out of the roughly 18 per cent of Nigerians in 
self-employment activity, the urban households take roughly 34 per cent share, whereas the 
rural households take about 64 per cent share. This implies that informal activities in rural 
areas are double the proportion in urban areas. For wage employment, revealing about 9 per 
cent share of total households, the urban and rural workers total 43 per cent and 56 per 
cent15 shares respectively. In summary, the above table uncovers a small formal sector 
(wage employment) size of about 9 per cent, and a total large informal sector (both farming 
and self-employment) size of roughly 52 per cent of the total survey sample. Notably, the 
current study applies the tax code on the 9 per cent formal sector16 when considering 
ineffective tax administration. However, to compare results and see differences in formal and 
informal incomes the study also applies taxes on the total sector (formal and informal) 
proportion of 61 per cent.   
 
The second part of Table 2 also reveals some differences in terms of the average income 
shares of households between the formal and the informal sectors. Relative to the average 
income share (₦802,127) from wage employment activities (9 per cent), self-employment 
activities (34 per cent) generate the largest average income share (₦912,863). A similar 
trend is also observed in terms of urban-rural division. Self-employment activities in the 
urban (34 per cent) and rural (64 per cent) sectors generate the largest average income 
shares (₦1,263,509) and (₦715,273) as compared with the income shares (₦944,851) and 
(₦691,790) from wage activities in the urban and rural sectors respectively. These results are 
of no surprise following the large size of the informal sector, a total of about 52 per cent 
comprising both farming and self-employment. In terms of agriculture as part of the informal 
sector, farming activities in rural areas produce the largest average income share (₦88,059), 
relative to the share (₦39,728) generated in the urban sector. This result is also anticipated 
following the fact that farming activities concentrate more in the rural (about 89 per cent) than 
in the urban (11 per cent) part of the country. Similarly, the survey reports that urban 
households in farming activities produce output mainly for household consumption, as 
compared with rural farmers producing largely for sale, though reserving some part for 
household consumption.  
 
5.2 Equity and redistribution analysis of taxation reforms 
 
This subsection mainly presents the result of the incidence and the redistributive effect of 
taxation (PIT and VAT) reforms without and with the above proposed informal sector 
correction to enable comparison using the Kakwani Index and the simple static micro-
simulation method in the Nigeria context.  
 
13  Mainly comprise fish farming, crop cultivation, and livestock rearing activities.  
14  Within this proportion, some people normally work in any of the first three activities listed above and are temporarily 
absent but plan to return. Some are not engaged but actively searching, while some are either not actively searching or 
have applied for a particular activity and are awaiting a response.  
15  The relatively large share of workers in the rural areas is of little surprise in the current day Nigeria. Due to inflated 
prices, workers face high costs of living in urban areas. To solve this issue, most workers with relatively low earnings 
prefer to live in rural areas where cost of livings (e.g. rent, food) are somewhat cheaper.  
16  Note that all workers in the formal sector pay taxes in Nigeria. No one is exempted. Even the very low-income earners 
with no taxable income pay a minimum tax rate of 0.5 per cent in the pre-2011 scheme and 1 per cent in the current PIT 
scheme (see the graduated tax rules in tables 9 and 10 of the appendix).  
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Table 3 Progressivity of PIT under each scenario (both national and regional 
estimates) 
Kakwani Index Coef. Std. Err. t-value Prob. Conf. Interval 
First part Estimates without informal sector correction 
Pre-2011 PIT scheme      
National  0.1341 0.0109 12.23 0.000 0.1126   0.1556 
Urban 0.1051 0.0144 7.29 0.000 0.0768   0.1334 
Rural 0.1516 0.0116 13.11 0.000 0.1289   0.1743 
Post-2011 PIT reform      
National -0.0277 0.0176 1.56 0.116 -0.0622 -0.0068 
Urban 0.0600 0.0276 2.21 0.027  0.0068  0.1151 
Rural -0.1163 0.0207 -5.62 0.000 -0.1569 -0.0756 
Second part Estimates with informal sector correction 
Pre-2011 PIT scheme      
National 0.1189 0.0483 2.46 0.014  0.0240  0.2138 
Urban 0.0845 0.0726 1.16 0.245 -0.0581  0.2270 
Rural 0.1386 0.0511 2.71 0.007  0.0383  0.2389 
Post-2011 PIT reform      
National -0.3684 0.0300 -12.27 0.000 -0.1498 -0.2186 
Urban -0.3453 0.0513 -6.73 0.000 -0.4461 -0.2445 
Rural -0.3723 0.0341 -10.92 0.000 -0.4393 -0.3054 
 
Table 3 presents the Kakwani Indices under the pre-2011 and post-2011 income tax reform 
scenarios, both without and with informal sector correction. According to estimates without 
informal sector correction in the first part of this table, the pre-2011 income tax scheme yields 
a positive Kakwani Index at the national (0.1341), urban (0.1051) and rural (0.1516) levels 
respectively. This implies that income tax was progressive in the pre-2011 scheme at both 
national and regional levels. Intuitively, the poor pay less, whereas the rich pay more of their 
income as tax within this scheme. In contrast, the post-2011 income tax scheme reveals a 
negative Kakwani Index at the national level (-0.0277). Although the index is positive at the 
urban level (0.0600), it still remains negative at the rural level (-0.1163). The reason for 
differences here could be because of scale effect. The survey data reveals that people 
residing in the rural area responded more to the survey relative to urban residents. Following 
from the negative national Kakwani Index, however, it is concluded that the income tax is 
regressive in the post-2011 scheme. Put differently, this is a pro-rich scheme, where the rich 
individual pays less, whereas the poor individual pays more of their income to the tax 
system.  
 
Table 3 also presents the Kakwani Indices in the pre-2011 and post-2011 income tax 
schemes, but accounting for informality in the economy. The results as seen in the second 
part of this table show a similar trend to recorded estimates without correcting for informality 
but reveal differences in the size of Kakwani Indices. Here, the pre-2011 scheme yields a 
positive Kakwani Index at the national (0.1189), urban (0.0845), and rural level (0.1386) 
respectively. In terms of regional differences, the PIT after accounting for informality tends to 
be more progressive in rural than in urban areas. As mentioned above, these differences 
could be attributed to the scale effect – respondents in rural areas responding more to the 
survey, relative to responses recorded in urban areas. In general, the results simply imply a 
progressive income tax when accounting for informality. However, the sizes of the Kakwani 
Indices are lesser compared to estimates without correcting informality. This simply means 
that when informality is corrected, income tax becomes less progressive. On the contrary, 
the post-2011 scheme produces a negative Kakwani Index at the national (-0.3684), urban (-
0.3453) and rural (-0.3723) levels, which mainly implies a regressive income tax when 
informality is accounted for. However, the Kakwani Index is more negative compared to the 
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estimated index without correcting informality. This simply means that when informality is 
taken into account, income tax becomes more regressive in Nigeria. In summary, we deduce 
from the above analyses that the actual income tax progressivity tends to be overestimated 
when ineffective tax administration is not put into consideration.  
 
Further, the regressivity results above could be partly attributable to the fact that the current 
PIT tax structure does not clearly differentiate the middle (low) income from high-income 
earners, since virtually most middle-income earners reach a high marginal tax rate of up to 
21 per cent. For instance the PIT Act provides that two individual taxpayers with total annual 
income of ₦1.6m and ₦3.2m reach a high graduated tax rate, even though the former’s 
income amount is less than the average annual cost of living within the current day realities 
(inflated prices) in Nigeria. This regressivity finding is line with what was reported in Egbon 
and Mgbame 2015. In their anecdotal study of income tax progressivity, they found that the 
current PIT regime in Nigeria is regressive, i.e. the scheme is more pro-rich than it is pro-
poor. This also follows from the fact that in this current scheme the low-income earners or 
workers with no taxable income still pay a tax rate of 1 per cent, which is 50 per cent higher 
than the minimum rate of 0.5 per cent paid by wage workers in the old tax scheme. The 
regressivity results could be mainly attributable to the growing debate (e.g. Avram 2017; 
Cano 2017) pointing to the direction that the lump sum relief allowance limits income tax 
progressivity, since it mainly accrues to taxpayers at the top of the income distribution. The 
current study confirms this by plotting the decile shares of the post-2011 PIT relief allowance 
in Figure 1.    
 
Figure 1 Decile shares of the post-2011 PIT consolidated relief allowance (CRA)  
 
Source: Author’s calculation using income adjusted for underreporting in the latest survey data. 
 
Figure 1 shows the decile distribution of the deductible relief allowance (₦200,000 plus 28 
per cent of income) in the post-2011 PIT scheme. Bearing in mind that the highest income 
earners are missing in the survey, the figure above at least shows some light, that the largest 
proportion of the lump sum relief allowance (13.3 per cent) in the post-2011 tax scheme 
belongs to the top 10 per cent of taxpayers at the upper end of the distribution, while the 
smallest amount (8 per cent) goes to the 10 per cent at the bottom of the distribution. Indeed, 
this kind of distribution induces regressivity. In other words, the top 10 per cent (high-income) 
taxpayers have benefited the most from income tax deductions relative to the low-income 
taxpayers. This finding is in line with those of previous related studies (Avram 2017; Cano 
2017; Inchauste and Rubil 2017), showing that taxpayers at the top of the income class 
benefit the most from income tax relief deductions, relative to taxpayers at the bottom of the 
income class. This confirms the finding in Table 3 of the regressivity of the post-2011 PIT 
scheme. If high-income taxpayers are able to claim the largest share of the relief allowance, 
then they enjoy a lower taxable income, and hence pay less income tax, relative to the low-
income taxpayers. To attempt to address this problem, the current study examines in tables 
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4 and 7 some counterfactual scenarios involving the capping/regulation of the newly 
introduced lump sum relief allowance.    
 
Table 4 Simulating progressivity of the post-2011 PIT relief structure (national and 
regional estimates)17 
Kakwani Index Coef. Std. Err. t-value Prob. Conf. interval 
Base scenario  Variable and fixed parts of the relief allowance (CRA) without cap 
National -0.3684 0.0300 -12.27 0.000 -0.1498 -0.2186 
Urban -0.3453 0.0513 -6.73 0.000 -0.4461 -0.2445 
Rural -0.3723 0.0341 -10.92 0.000 -0.4393 -0.3054 
Scenario one Cap only the fixed part of the CRA at ₦100,000 
National -0.3192 0.0300 -10.63 0.000 -0.3781 -0.2603 
Urban -0.2841 0.0505 -5.63 0.000 -0.3832 -0.1849 
Rural -0.3362 0.0335 -10.02 0.000 -0.4021 -0.2704 
Scenario two Cap the variable and fixed parts of the CRA at 10% and ₦100,000 resp. 
National -0.2917 0.0308 -9.49 0.000 -0.3520 -0.2313 
Urban  -0.2526 0.0521 -4.85 0.000 -0.3549 -0.1503 
Rural -0.3153 0.0334 -9.45 0.000 -0.3809 -0.2498 
Scenario three Give the variable part to low-income taxpayers only, and the fixed part to all taxpayers  
National 0.0050 0.0188 0.27 0.788 -0.0319 0.0420 
Urban  0.0059 0.0285 0.21 0.836 -0.0502 0.0621 
Rural -0.0055 0.0208 -0.27 0.789 -0.0464 0.0353 
Notes: 1 The base scenario is the actual situation where the variable and fixed parts of the CRA are not capped. 
2 In scenario one, the fixed part of the CRA is capped at ₦100,000. 
3 In scenario two, the variable and fixed parts of the CRA are capped at 10% and ₦100,000 respectively. 
4 In scenario three, the variable part (20% + 8%) is only for taxpayers below a predefined income threshold, whereas the fixed 
part is for all taxpayers. 
5 As previously mentioned, the results of scenario four are very similar to that of scenario three, so that the study intentionally 
excluded them in Table 4 above – to dodge verbosity. But the results are available upon request. 
 
Table 4 presents the equity results of the post-2011 PIT relief policy simulations. It is clear 
from this table that the Kakwani Indices of progressivity are negative in simulated scenarios 
one and two. This means that the PIT remains regressive, albeit much less relative to that of 
the base scenario. However, a striking opposite result is observed in scenario three where 
the variable part of the relief allowance is given to only the low-income taxpayers below a 
predefined income threshold of ₦314,000, entirely excluding high-income taxpayers above or 
equal to the threshold (see threshold definition above). In this scenario three, the Kakwani 
Index becomes positive across national and subnational levels (excluding the rural region 
with a little difference – attributable mainly to sample scale effect). The interpretation of 
scenarios one and two is an obvious decline in regressivity, relative to the base scenario. 
However, the general interpretation of scenario three is an obvious progressivity effect, 
relative to scenarios one and two and base scenario. As seen in Table 4, there is a reduction 
in the Kakwani Index at the national level from -0.3684 in the base scenario to -0.3192 in 
scenario one, and further down to -0.2917 in scenario two. On the contrary, there is a clearly 
national progressivity effect (0.0050) in scenario three. Notably, the declining regressivity 
trend in scenario one and two is also observed at the subnational levels, both urban and 
rural. In terms of scenario three, the progressivity effect is also similar across the national 
and subnational levels (though a little different in the rural region – attributable to scale 
effect). To make things clear, the urban positive effect (0.0059) is just enough to cancel out 
the rural negative effect (-0.0055). So the overall result in scenario three is a clear 
 
17  Note that the simulation results presented in this table 4 and table 7 below are only for the case of ‘corrected 
informality’. The simulation results ‘without informality correction’ are intentionally not presented, mainly to avoid 
ambiguity. In this subsection, the focus is more on results with corrected ineffective tax administration. Notably, the 
results presented here are still in similar direction with results – ‘without informal sector correction’. The latter results are 
available upon request.  
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progressivity effect, relative to the base scenario across the country. The results of the 
simulated scenarios one and two simply imply that progressivity will improve (albeit through a 
declining regressivity) if the lump sum relief allowance in the post-2011 PIT Act is capped. 
Contrariwise, the result of the simulated scenario three simply implies that progressivity will 
improve even more through a positive Kakwani Index, relative to scenarios one and two, if 
the variable part of the lump sum relief allowance is provided to only low-income taxpayers 
below a predefined income threshold (₦314,000), with the high-income taxpayers entirely 
excluded. Hence, for equity reasons, it is crucial that the variable part of the lump sum tax 
relief allowance is provided only for low-income taxpayers, while the fixed part can go to all 
taxpayers. Indeed, these findings are similar to the outcomes of previous works, showing that 
the distributional consequence of tax relief allowances are generally not progressive (e.g. 
Avram 2017), but that these tax deductions with proper restriction help to engender 
progressivity on the distribution of income (e.g. Farfan-Portet, Hindricks and Lorant 2008). 
 
Table 5 Progressivity of VAT under each scenario (both national and regional 
estimates) 
Kakwani Index Coef. Std. Err. t-value Prob. Conf. interval 
First part Estimates without informal sector correction 
Pre-2020 scheme (5% VAT)      
National -0.3887 0.0098 -39.54 0.000 -0.4080   -0.3694 
Urban -0.3577 0.0148 -24.17 0.000 -0.3868   -0.3287 
Rural -0.3755 0.0094 -40.08 0.000 -0.3939   -0.3571 
2020 reform (7.5% VAT)      
National -0.3887 0.0098 -39.54 0.000 -0.4080 - -0.3694 
Urban -0.3577 0.0148 -24.17 0.000 -0.3868   -0.3287 
Rural -0.3755 0.0094 -40.08 0.000 -0.3939   -0.3571 
Second part Estimates with informal sector correction 
Pre-2020 scheme (2.5% VAT)      
National -0.3887 0.0098 -39.54 0.000 -0.4080   -0.3694 
Urban -0.3577 0.0148 -24.17 0.000 -0.3868   -0.3287 
Rural -0.3755 0.0094 -40.08 0.000 -0.3939   -0.3571 
2020 reform (3.8% VAT)      
National -0.3887 0.0098 -39.54 0.000 -0.4080   -0.3694 
Urban -0.3577 0.0148 -24.17 0.000 -0.3868   -0.3287 
Rural -0.3755 0.0094 -40.08 0.000 -0.3939   -0.3571 
 
Table 5 reports the Kakwani Indices under the pre-2020 and current VAT reform scenarios, 
both without and with informal sector correction. According to estimates without informal 
sector correction in the first part of Table 5, the pre-2020 scheme18 yields a negative 
Kakwani Index at the national (-0.3887) urban (-0.3577) and rural (-0.3755) levels. 
Regionally, the VAT tends to be more regressive in the rural relative to the urban area. 
Hence, aside from the scale effect mentioned above, this result could also be attributed to 
people in rural regions consuming more vatable items, compared to the wealthy in urban 
regions consuming luxuries with little or no VAT. But in general the results suggest that VAT 
was regressive in the pre-2020 scheme. In other words, the rich pay less whereas the poor 
pay more VAT. Similarly, the 2020 scheme19 reveals a negative Kakwani Index across 
national (-0.3887), and regional levels. This implies a regressive VAT in the post-2020 
scheme. This further suggests a pro-rich scheme, where the rich individual pays less, 
whereas the poor pays more VAT.  
 
18  In the pre-2020 scheme the VAT was a 5 per cent flat rate. 




Table 5 also presents the Kakwani Indices in the pre-2020 and 2020 VAT schemes, but in 
consideration of the informal sector.20 The results in the second part of this table also show 
identical trends and size of Kakwani Indices to estimates without correcting for informality. 
The Kakwani Indices after correcting for informality were also found to be negative both at 
the national and regional levels. Thus, we reach the conclusion that the VAT schemes taking 
account of informality are also regressive – pro-rich in nature. In fact, this simply means that 
correcting for informality by applying 2.5 per cent and 3.8 per cent effective VAT rates21 to 
vatable items for the pre and post-2020 schemes leaves the regressive size of VAT 
unchanged. These results could be partly attributed to the fact that the variations in statutory 
and effective VAT rates22 may not be sizeable enough to make significant changes to the 
reported Kakwani Indices. More specifically, in terms of the results of similar regressive sizes 
of VAT variables across the schemes. The major reason attributable to these results is the 
fact that the household’s VAT proportionate contribution to the total tax payment yields the 
same value regardless of the differentiated VAT rates (as figured out from the survey data). 
Note that the monetary amount contributed by the household changes at differentiated rates, 
but the percentage contribution to the aggregate tax payment remains the same even at 
differentiated rates (as crosschecked from the data). The Kakwani method does not directly 
use the monetary tax amount contributed by the household, but indirectly employs the 
household’s percentage share of the aggregate tax payment in the calculation of the 
progressivity/regressivity index (Kakwani 1977; O’Donnell, Van Doorslaer, Wagstaff and 
Lindelow 2008). From the survey data, for instance, the first household contributes ₦1,500 to 
aggregate tax payment of ₦23,011,184 at a 5 per cent VAT rate. This household’s share in 
the aggregate tax payment ₦1,500 divided by ₦23,011,184 yields a proportion of 0.007 per 
cent. As observed from the data, if the VAT is increased to 7.5 per cent, the contribution of 
the first household rises to ₦2,250, while aggregate tax payment rises to ₦34,516,776. This 
means the share of the household of the aggregate tax, i.e. ₦2,250 divided by ₦34,516,776 
at a differentiated VAT rate of 7.5 per cent, remains the same 0.007 per cent just as when 
the rate was 5 per cent.  
 
In summary, the household contributes 0.007 per cent (₦1,500) to the aggregate tax 
payment when the VAT rate is 5 per cent and also contributes the same percentage of 0.007 
per cent (₦2,250) when the VAT rate is changed to 7.5 per cent. From this illustration, it is 
clear that the tax monetary amount changes at differentiated rates, but the per cent share 
contribution to the aggregate amount does not differ. The Kakwani method’s calculation of a 
progressivity/regressivity index is not based on a differentiated absolute tax amount (₦1,500 
or ₦2,250) but based on this household’s undifferentiated per cent share contribution (0.007 
per cent) to the aggregate tax payment (as observed from the Kakwani Index formula). 
Further, the results in Table 5 are supported with what was found in previous similar studies 
(Decoster and Verbina 2003; Sivashankar et al. 2017). Just as seen in Table 5, Sivashankar 
et al. 2017 in their work on incidence of value added taxation on inequality revealed that 
different VAT rates of 11 per cent and 15 per cent analysed for different policy reforms of 
2011 and 2016 produced the same Kakwani Index of progressivity of 0.181 for 11 per cent 
and 0.181 for 15 per cent. Their results are also similar when split between the urban and 
 
20  Informality was accounted for by using effective VAT rates instead of the statutory rates. 
21  In line with previous related literature, the effective VAT rate (ETR) was computed using macro VAT revenue and 
consumption data. The ETR for the pre-2020 scheme was calculated as 2.5 per cent. Notably, the current study has 
utilised available and more detailed macro (i.e. 2018) data for the pre-2020 ETR calculation. Currently, the Nigeria 
National Bureau of Statistics has not released detailed macro consumption data for the 2020 period. Hence, the 
calculation of the 2020 ETR to reflect the recent 50 per cent increase in VAT rate becomes very difficult. To try to solve 
this issue, the current study assumes that for the 2020 period, the pre-2020 ETR rose by 50 per cent, yielding a 3.8 per 
cent ETR. Reasonably, this assumption is based on the 50 per cent increase in the pre-2020 statutory rate. 
22  For instance, in the pre-2020 scheme, the statutory VAT rate is 5 per cent, whereas the calculated effective rate for the 
same period is only 2.5 per cent. Also, for the 2020 scheme, the statutory rate is 7.5 per cent (i.e. a 50 per cent increase 
on the previous scheme), and the corresponding effective rate is computed as a 50 per cent increase on the previous 
effective rate (i.e. 3.8 per cent). 
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rural areas. Specifically, the urban results yielded the same index of 0.187 in both the 2011 
and 2016 reform periods while the rural results yielded the same index of 0.173 in both the 
2011 and 2016 reform periods. They concluded that VAT revisions made no significant 
change on inequality and tax incidence in Sri Lanka.   
 
Table 6 Estimated effects of PIT under each scenario with respect to the base scenario 
(both national and regional estimates) 
 0 1 A 2 B 
 Base Pre-2011 PIT Actual effect Post-2011 PIT Actual effect 
First part Estimates without informal sector correction 
National estimates      
Inequality indicator      
Gini coefficient 0.3895 0.3737 -0.016 0.3869 -0.003 
Poverty headcount      
Pov 0 (%) 41.83 46.22 4.39 42.24 0.41 
Poverty gap       
Pov 1 (%) 17.49 19.06 1.57 17.68 0.19 
Poverty severity       
Pov 2 (%) 10.79 11.54 0.75 10.89 0.10 
Urban estimates      
Inequality indicator      
Gini coefficient 0.3614 0.3478 -0.014 0.3571 -0.004 
Poverty headcount      
Pov 0 (%) 23.08 26.70 3.62 23.40 0.32 
Poverty gap       
Pov 1 (%) 10.21 11.17 0.96 10.31 0.10 
Poverty severity       
Pov 2 (%) 07.45 07.81 0.36 07.49 0.04 
Rural estimates      
Inequality indicator      
Gini coefficient 0.3763 0.3606 -0.016 0.3747 -0.002 
Poverty headcount      
Pov 0 (%) 50.18 54.91 4.73 50.63 0.45 
Poverty gap       
Pov 1 (%) 20.74 22.58 1.84 20.97 0.23 
Poverty severity       
Pov 2 (%) 12.28 13.21 0.93 12.41 0.13 
 Estimates with informal sector correction  
National estimates      
Inequality indicator      
Gini coefficient 0.3895 0.3888 -0.001 0.3894 -0.000 
Poverty headcount      
Pov 0 (%) 41.83 42.04 0.21 41.89 0.06 
Poverty gap      
Pov 1 (%) 17.49 17.58 0.09 17.51 0.02 
Poverty severity      
Pov 2 (%) 10.79 10.83 0.04 10.80 0.01 
Urban estimates      
Inequality indicator      
Gini coefficient 0.3614 0.3610 -0.00 0.3613 -0.00 
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Poverty headcount      
Pov 0 (%) 23.08 23.30 0.22 23.13 0.05 
Poverty gap      
Pov 1 (%) 10.21 10.27 0.06 10.22 0.01 
Poverty severity      
Pov 2 (%) 07.45 07.47 0.02 07.45 0.00 
Rural estimates      
Inequality indicator      
Gini coefficient 0.3763 0.3755 -0.00 0.3762 -0.00 
Poverty headcount      
Pov 0 (%) 50.18 50.39 0.21 50.24 0.06 
Poverty gap      
Pov 1 (%) 20.74 20.84 0.10 20.76 0.02 
Poverty severity      
Pov 2 (%) 12.28 12.33 0.05 12.29 0.01 
 
The first part of Table 6 reveals results on the redistributive effect of income tax based on 
various reform scenarios, but without correcting for informality at both national and regional 
levels. In this table, the redistributive effect of income tax on the Gini coefficient and each 
poverty level is reported with respect to the base scenario (i.e. before taxes) shown in 
column 0. Column A in the above table reveals the actual redistributive effect of the pre-2011 
tax scheme. According to the simulation result in this column, the pre-2011 tax scheme 
reduced inequality by 0.016 points. On the contrary, poverty headcount rose by roughly 4.4 
per cent, implying that the scheme moved a considerable number of Nigerians below the 
poverty line. A similar trend could also be observed of the results uncovering the effect of 
income tax on the poverty gap and poverty severity. These results do not differ significantly 
when compared with the results found at the regional level. In the urban and rural regions, 
the pre-2011 tax scheme reduced inequality by 0.014 and 0.016 Gini points respectively. On 
the other hand, the poverty headcount increased in the urban and rural regions by 3.62 per 
cent and 4.73 per cent respectively. But some little differences exist, with income tax 
increasing poverty more in the rural than in the urban regions. This regional difference, 
though not large, is not surprising since the rural region contains more poor households, with 
an estimated high poverty level of about 50.2 per cent as seen in column 0 of Table 6. On 
the whole, however, the increased poverty is possibly due to the old structure of the 1993/98 
Nigeria PIT tax laws. In the old PIT scheme, poor individuals with no taxable income were 
still taxed at the rate of 0.5 per cent. This implies that poor Nigerians were still obliged to pay 
income taxes – a result in agreement with the conclusion reached in the anecdotal work of 
Osakwe (1999).  
 
Column B of Table 6 reports the actual redistributive effect of the post-2011 income tax 
scheme. This current scheme produces a negligible income redistributive effect in terms of 
reduction in the Gini coefficient across national and regional levels. These results are 
confirmed using the Lorenz curves shown in Figure 2 of the appendix. In this figure, the 
Lorenz curves lie quite on top of each other under the considered scenarios, implying an 
insignificant income redistributive effect.23 Further, as can be seen in column B, the poverty 
headcount does not decrease but the recorded increases at the national (0.4 per cent), urban 
(0.3 per cent) and rural (0.4 per cent) levels are quite less than what were observed in the 
previous scheme at the national (4.4 per cent), urban (3.6 per cent) and rural (4.7 per cent) 
 
23  Note that the income redistributive effect in the post-2011 scheme is more insignificant than that of the pre-2011 
scheme, though not clearly shown by the Lorenz curves. However, the curves are presented as only supports, bearing 
in mind that Lorenz and Concentration curves are not adequate for convenient comparison (O’Donnell et al. 2008), 
relative to clear indices and estimates, already presented above. 
32 
 
levels. The results of the poverty gap and severity also follow an identical trend, as seen in 
Table 6.  
 
The second part of Table 6 also presents these results after accounting for the informal 
sector (i.e. by excluding informal earnings). As seen in column A, the pre-2011 scheme 
reduced inequality by a lesser point at the national (0.001), urban (0.00) and rural (0.00) 
levels compared to the points recorded without correcting for the informal sector. This implies 
that excluding informal sector workers from the income tax bracket leads to a more negligible 
change in the Gini coefficient.24 A similar trend can be seen in the change in poverty 
headcount by only 0.21 per cent, 0.22 per cent and 0.21 per cent in national, urban and rural 
regions respectively compared to what was seen (4.4 per cent, 3.6 per cent and 4.7 per cent) 
at these levels when we fail to correct for the informal sector. Further, the redistributive effect 
of the post-2011 income tax scheme corrected for ineffective tax administration (i.e. by 
excluding the informal sector participation) reveals an identical trend. As seen in column B, 
the post-2011 scheme reduced the Gini coefficient by only 0.0 per cent at national, urban 
and rural levels, and marginally increased poverty to roughly 0.06 per cent at the three levels 
mentioned above. In general, the study partly attributes this negligible redistributive effect 
(inequality reduction) to the lump sum tax relief (i.e. the consolidated relief allowance) 
introduced in the post-2011 tax scheme, which has favoured the high-income more than the 
low-income taxpayers (see Figure 1). This finding is in line with that of previous related 
studies (Avram 2017; Cano 2017; Inchauste and Rubil 2017), showing that the relief 
allowance tends to undermine the redistributive capacity of the income tax, since it mainly 
concentrates at the top of the income distribution. To attempt to address this issue, the study 
conducted some counterfactual simulations, involving the regulation of the post-2011 lump 
sum relief allowance, to see their effect on inequality and poverty: see Table 7.   
 
 
24  This confirms the above argument in the method subsection that the inclusion of the un-taxed informal sector workers in 
the analyses may overestimate the redistributive effect of the income tax. 
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Table 7 Simulating redistributive effects of the post-2011 PIT relief structure (national 
and regional estimates) 




















        
Gini coefficient 0.3895 -0.0000 0.3893 -0.0002 0.3892 -0.0003 0.3842 -0.0053 
Poverty 
headcount 
        
Pov 0 (%) 41.89 0.06 41.89 0.06  41.87 0.04 39.89 -2.00 
Poverty gap         
Pov 1 (%) 17.51 0.02 17.51 0.02 17.51 0.02  13.45 -4.06 
Poverty 
severity 
        




        
Gini coefficient 0.3613 -0.0000 0.3611 -0.0003  0.3610 -0.0004 0.3386 -0.0227 
Poverty 
headcount 
        
Pov 0 (%) 23.13 0.05 23.13 0.05  23.13 0.05 19.21 -3.92 
Poverty gap         
Pov 1 (%) 10.22 0.01 10.21 0.00 10.21 0.00 5.01 -5.21 
Poverty 
severity 
        




        
Gini coefficient 0.3762 -0.0000 0.3761 -0.0002 0.3760 -0.0002 0.3838 0.0076 
Poverty 
headcount 
        
Pov 0 (%) 50.24 0.06 50.23 0.05 50.21 0.04 48.85 -1.39 
Poverty gap         
Pov 1 (%) 20.76 0.02 20.75 0.01 20.75 0.01 17.11 -3.65 
Poverty 
severity 
        
Pov 2 (%) 12.29 0.01 12.29 0.01  12.29  0.01  8.11 -4.18 
Note: 1 The base scenario is the actual situation where the variable and fixed parts of the relief allowance (CRA) are not capped. 
2 In scenario one, the fixed part of the CRA is capped at ₦100,000. 
3 In scenario two, the variable and fixed parts of the CRA are capped at 10% and ₦100,000 respectively. 
4 In scenario three, the variable part (20% + 8%) is only for income taxpayers below a predefined income threshold, whereas the 
fixed part is for all income taxpayers.  
5 Note again that the results of scenario four are intentionally not reported, since they are very similar to those of scenario three. 
 
Table 7 presents the redistribution results of the post-2011 PIT relief policy simulations. The 
results are similar and confirm the outcomes of the equity implications of the relief allowance 
presented in Table 4. Table 7 reveals an increased redistributive effect of the income tax with 
regulated relief structure in simulated scenarios one and two. However, when high-income 
taxpayers above or equal to a predefined income threshold are entirely excluded from 
sharing in the variable part of the lump sum relief in simulated scenario three, a large 
increased redistributive effect is observed, relative to those of scenarios one and two. As 
seen from Table 7, inequality at the national level is declined by some amount, though 
marginal in scenarios one and two. Contrariwise, inequality is declined by a larger amount in 
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scenario three where the variable part of the relief allowance is provided only to the low-
income taxpayers, entirely excluding the high-income taxpayers. While the decline in 
inequality in the base scenario is just -0.0000, the decline in scenarios one and two is at least 
relatively higher, by -0.0002 and -0.0003 respectively. However, the decline in scenario three 
is relatively much bigger, -0.0053. Intuitively, the Gini index is more negative in scenarios 
one and two, relative to the base scenario. But in scenario three it is much more negative 
compared to the base scenario and scenarios one and two. More so, this trend of declining 
inequality at the national level is similar to what is observed across the subnational (urban 
and rural) levels in both scenarios one and two. In scenario three, the large effect of declining 
inequality at the national level is also similar to that observed at the subnational level, except 
the rural region (although as mentioned above attributable to the scale effect). Just to be 
clear, the large inequality decline (-0.0227) observed in the urban region is more than 
enough to cancel out the marginal positive effect (0.0076) in the rural region. So that in 
general a huge declining inequality is observed across the country in simulated scenario 
three where relatively high-income taxpayers do not take any share in the variable part of the 
lump sum relief allowance. In terms of poverty, a similar trend is also noticed. The national 
poverty level is declined from 0.06 in the base scenario to 0.04 in scenario two. On the 
contrary, a marked poverty reduction effect is seen in scenario three. In scenario three, 
poverty is largely declined down to -2.00, relative to the marginal decline observed in 
scenario two. While the urban poverty headcount shows little or no change across scenarios 
one and two, the rural poverty headcount is declined from 0.06 in the base scenario to 0.04 
in scenario two. However, a relatively marked difference is seen for the urban and rural 
poverty reduction effects in scenario three. In scenario three, poverty level is largely reduced 
to -3.92 and -1.39 in the urban and rural areas respectively. The results of the simulated 
scenarios one and two simply mean that redistribution will enhance (through declining 
inequality and poverty levels) if the relief allowance in the post-2011 PIT Act is capped or 
modified. However, a much bigger redistribution is seen in scenario three. In particular, if an 
eligibility criterion is used to exclude high-income taxpayers from sharing in the variable part 
of the relief allowance, by providing it to only low-income taxpayers below a predefined 
income threshold, inequality and poverty are markedly reduced. Hence, it is important to 
properly regulate the variable part of the tax relief allowance, to significantly improve the 
welfare of the poor people. These findings confirm outcomes in previous related studies (e.g. 
Avram 2017), revealing that the regulation of relief allowance helps to boost the redistributive 




Table 8 Estimated effects of VAT under each scenario with respect to the base 
scenario (both national and regional estimates) 
 0 1 A 2 B  
 Base Pre-2020 VAT Actual effect 2020 VAT Actual effect 
First part Estimates without informal sector correction 
National estimates  
Inequality indicator      
Gini coefficient 0.3892 0.3911 0.002 0.3921 0.003 
Poverty headcount      
Pov 0 (%) 38.81 39.21 0.40 39.43 0.62 
Poverty gap       
Pov 1 (%) 13.11 13.41 0.30 13.56 0.45 
Poverty severity       
Pov 2 (%) 06.00 06.21 0.21 06.32 0.32 
Urban estimates      
Inequality indicator      
Gini coefficient 0.3603 0.3615 0.00 0.3622 0.00 
Poverty headcount      
Pov 0 (%) 18.36 18.68 0.32 18.90 0.54 
Poverty gap       
Pov 1 (%) 04.76 04.90 0.14 04.98 0.22 
Poverty severity       
Pov 2 (%) 01.84 01.91 0.07 01.95 0.11 
Rural estimates      
Inequality indicator      
Gini coefficient 0.3763 0.3785 0.00 0.3796 0.00 
Poverty headcount      
Pov 0 (%) 47.92 48.35 0.43 48.57 0.65 
Poverty gap       
Pov 1 (%) 16.83 17.20 0.37 17.39 0.56 
Poverty severity       
Pov 2 (%) 07.86 08.13 0.27 08.27 0.41 
Second part Estimates with informal sector correction  
National estimates      
Inequality indicator      
Gini coefficient 0.3892 0.3901 0.001 0.3906 0.001 
Poverty headcount      
Pov 0 (%) 38.81 39.06 0.25 39.15 0.34 
Poverty gap      
Pov 1 (%) 13.11 13.26 0.15 13.33 0.22 
Poverty severity      
Pov 2 (%) 06.00 06.10 0.10 06.16 0.16 
Urban estimates      
Inequality indicator      
Gini coefficient 0.3602 0.3609 0.00 0.3612 0.00 
Poverty headcount      
Pov 0 (%) 18.36 18.51 0.15 18.60 0.24 
Poverty gap      
Pov 1 (%) 04.76 04.83 0.07 04.87 0.11 
Poverty severity      
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Pov 2 (%) 01.84 01.88 0.04 01.89 0.05 
Rural estimates      
Inequality indicator      
Gini coefficient 0.3763 0.3774 0.00 0.3779 0.00 
Poverty headcount      
Pov 0 (%) 47.92 48.22 0.30 48.31 0.39 
Poverty gap      
Pov 1 (%) 16.83 17.01 0.18 17.11 0.28 
Poverty severity      
Pov 2 (%) 07.86 07.99 0.13 08.06 0.20 
 
We now shift attention to the redistributive effect of VAT, as reported in Table 8. Estimates in 
the first part of the table are without informal sector correction, whereas estimates in the 
second part are with informal sector correction. In this table, the redistributive effect of VAT 
on the Gini coefficient and each poverty level is reported with respect to the base scenario 
(i.e. before the payment of VAT). Column A of the first part of the table shows the actual 
redistributive effect of the pre-2020 VAT scheme. Contrary to the redistributive effect of PIT 
on income inequality, the simulation result in this column shows that the pre-2020 VAT 
scheme increased inequality, though by only 0.002 points at the national level. The effects at 
the urban (0.00), and rural (0.00) levels are similar and very negligible. This opposing result 
of the PIT and VAT effects on inequality could be attributable to the regressive nature of VAT 
(as the same rate is applicable to both the rich and the poor) in Nigeria, as reported in Table 
5. In the same direction, poverty headcount rose by roughly 0.4 per cent, 0.3 per cent and 
0.4 per cent at national, urban and rural levels respectively. This implies that the VAT 
scheme also moved some Nigerians below the poverty line, though by a small margin as 
compared to the proportions (4.4 per cent, 3.6 per cent and 4.7 per cent triggered by PIT at 
the national, urban and rural levels respectively. The observed increase in poverty due to 
VAT is also linkable to its regressive nature and probably to the fact that more low-income 
individuals consume vatable goods and still pay the same flat rate as high-income 
individuals. Notably, the result of a negligible increase in inequality due to VAT is consistent 
with previous related works in middle-income countries, e.g. Jellema et al. 2017, which 
revealed that VAT has a positive marginal impact on inequality in Indonesia.  
 
Column B of the first part of Table 8 reports the actual redistributive effect of the 2020 VAT 
scheme. Similar to the old VAT scheme, the 2020 scheme also produces a negligible 
increase in the Gini coefficient. This finding is strengthened using the Lorenz curves shown 
in Figure 3 in the appendix. In this figure, the Lorenz curves of the various schemes lie on top 
of each other. Though the increase in inequality is negligible it is just a bit higher relative to 
the increase (0.002) witnessed in the pre-2020 scheme at the national level. More so, the 
urban and rural level effects remain very similar and roughly very marginal. Overall, the 
observed increase could be attributable to the increase in the policy VAT rate from 5 per cent 
to 7.5 per cent by the federal government in the early 2020 period. Further, as can be seen in 
column B, the 2020 VAT scheme increased poverty by 0.6 per cent – roughly 1 per cent at 
the national level, 0.5 per cent at the urban level and 0.6 per cent at the rural level. These 
proportions are slightly higher than the values reported (0.4 per cent, 0.3 per cent and 0.4 
per cent respectively) as the effects of pre-2020 VAT on poverty. This change is of no 
surprise following the 50 per cent increase in VAT as mentioned above. Intuitively, the 
currently increased policy VAT rate will likely push some more Nigerians below the poverty 
line. Notably, the results for the poverty gap and severity produce an identical pattern, as 
seen in column A and B of the first part of Table 8.    
 
The second part of Table 8 also presents the redistributive effect of VAT, but after accounting 
for the informal sector. As mentioned previously, this study has accounted for informality in 
the calculation of VAT by using macroeconomic data (comprising of administrative and 
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national account data). In line with previous related studies (e.g. Schaffer and Turley 2001; 
Inchauste and Rubil 2017), the current study has specifically calculated the effective VAT 
rate by using the total value of VAT revenue collections (from the Federal Inland Revenue 
Service)25 divided by the total value of all goods and services subject to VAT (data compiled 
by the Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics).26 The calculated effective rate was then applied 
to the household purchases subject to VAT (Inchauste and Rubil 2017). As seen in column A 
of the second part of Table 8, the pre-2020 scheme increased the Gini coefficient by a lesser 
point (0.001) compared to the point recorded (0.002) without correcting for the informal 
sector at the national level. Notably, the regional level results, as seen in Table 8, remain 
very negligible. But overall the fact that the pre-2020 scheme Gini with informal correction 
was increased by a lesser point compared to the point recorded without informal sector 
correction means that accounting for the informal sector in the analyses leads to a lesser 
change in income inequality. Similarly, we observe a lesser change in poverty headcount at 
national (0.25 per cent), urban (0.15 per cent), and rural (0.30 per cent) levels compared to 
the proportion seen at the national (0.4 per cent), urban (0.3 per cent) and rural (0.4 per cent) 
levels when we fail to account for the informal sector. Further, the redistributive effect of the 
current VAT scheme corrected for the presence of the informal sector reveals a similar 
direction. In terms of comparison across schemes, the estimated effects of the current VAT 
scheme on inequality and poverty as seen in column B of Table 8 are slightly higher than the 
estimated values of the previous VAT scheme both without and with the informal sector 
correction. This of course is expected since the effective rate in the current VAT scheme is 
also slightly higher than that of the previous scheme.   
 
25  The OECD, African Union Commission (AUC) and African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) have reported detailed 
FIRS tax revenue composition data for the year 2018 in Nigeria (OECD/AUC/ATAF 2020).  
26  The Statistical Bulletin of the Central Bank of Nigeria reported detailed 2018 goods and services data compiled by the 
NBS for Nigeria (Central Bank of Nigeria 2018). 
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6  Discussion and conclusion  
 
This study attempts to address two related specific questions. First, what is the progressivity 
of income tax and VAT reforms in Nigeria? Second, what is the distributional effect of income 
tax and VAT reforms in Nigeria? In line with these specific questions, the current study yields 
several crucial findings. First, income tax was found to be progressive in the pre-2011 reform 
scheme but became regressive in the post-2011 reform scheme. It was also found that the 
newly introduced lump sum relief allowance concentrates more in the high-income than in 
the low-income taxpayers – confirming the regressivity of the post-2011 PIT scheme. 
However, the study uncovered that the regulation of the relief allowance in the post-2011 PIT 
scheme decreases the PIT regressivity. Of more interest is that if the variable part of the 
relief allowance in the post-2011 PIT scheme is reserved only for low-income taxpayers 
below a predefined income threshold, entirely excluding high-income taxpayers, the current 
PIT scheme becomes progressive. The above regressivity of the post-2011 PIT is also partly 
attributable to a tax table that barely differentiates the middle (low) income from high-income 
earners, since virtually most middle-income earners tend to reach a high marginal tax level. 
The tax brackets in the 2011 PIT scheme have been increased and this puts low-income 
earners in high tax bases and rates. However, in reality low-income earners in Nigeria are 
barely able to raise their wages, plus a minimum wage is hardly ever implemented to cover 
inflated prices. The regressivity of the post-2011 PIT could also be partly ascribed to the 
increase in the minimum tax rate (low-income tax rate) from 0.5 per cent in the pre-2011 
scheme to 1 per cent in the post-2011 scheme. Further, the post-2011 PIT regressivity result 
is similar to what was found in Hirvonen et al. 2016 and Mascagni et al. 2016, that a tax 
system initially designed to be progressive can still turn to be regressive. The VAT was 
regressive both in the pre-2020 scheme and in the current VAT reform scheme. The results 
for VAT are not far from what one would expect, since indirect taxes (e.g. VAT at fixed rates) 
are usually regressive (the poor paying more through increased purchases of vatable goods) 
probably because of its flat rate (everyone paying the same amount regardless of income 
size) (Younger and Khachatryan 2017; Alam, Inchauste and Serajuddin 2017; Arunatilake et 
al. 2017). Although VAT in Nigeria has a number of exemptions, they do not affect the 
progressivity of the tax instrument, and the higher income taxpayers tend to benefit the most 
from these exemptions (exemptions that are not pro-poor) in value terms.  
 
The answer to the second question in the pre-2011 PIT scheme is that limited redistribution 
occurred. The study disclosed pre-2011 PIT to have marginally reduced inequality, but on the 
converse increased poverty. The post-2011 PIT scheme reduced inequality and increased 
poverty but by a smaller proportion. The negligible redistributive results, as mentioned above, 
are attributable to the concentration of the lump sum relief allowance at the top of the 
distribution – consisting mainly of high-income taxpayers (see Figure 1). However, a larger 
redistributive effect is observed if high-income taxpayers above or equal to a predefined 
income threshold are entirely excluded from sharing in the variable part of the relief 
allowance. The limited redistributive role of the current PIT scheme could also be partly 
attributed to the exclusion of the large informal sector (nowadays some of the high-income 
people hide their businesses in the informal sector in order to dodge taxes) from the nation’s 
tax net, resulting in low tax collections (similarly as found in Jellema et al. (2017) for 
Indonesia). Hence, the need for the government to not only regulate the relief allowance but 
also capture the informal sector incomes, and at the same time maintain the basic equity and 
fairness principles of taxation. The finding of little income redistributive effect is consistent 
with the work of Hirvonen et al. (2016), which revealed that taxation had a negligible effect on 
Ethiopia’s Gini index. More so, the contradictory results of reduction in inequality and 
increase in poverty resulting from income tax is in accord with Lustig and Higgins (2012) and 
Inchauste and Lustig (2017), suggesting that an inequality-reducing tax system could also be 
poverty increasing, and that this cannot be exposed without a detailed empirical analysis. 
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The VAT was revealed to marginally increase both inequality and poverty in the pre-2020 
scheme. More so, the 2020 VAT scheme slightly increased inequality, but significantly 
increased poverty – a result similar to what was reported in Hill et al. (2017) and Arunatilake 
et al. (2017) for Ethiopia and Sri Lanka respectively.  
 
It is crucial to systematically weigh some caveats and corresponding assumptions relied 
upon, together with the consequences of relaxing these assumptions on the analyses of the 
current study.  
 
First, the study had no access to the real PIT variable. Hence, following existing studies, it 
obtained a proxy variable for PIT by applying the tax rules on incomes of individual 
households. This was done, assuming that people pay their complete taxes as stipulated by 
the law. Specifically, it is assumed that the calculated PIT is a good proxy of the real PIT. 
The study has relied on this assumption, since it has no access to administrative data 
containing the real tax amount that people actually pay. But what would have happened to 
the results if the paper was able to access and use the real PIT variable? If this had been 
possible, the clear consequence would have been that the incidence and redistribution 
analyses would have yielded lesser estimates. This is simply because in reality people have 
the tendency to dodge or understate their taxes.  
 
Second, household surveys are widely known to understate income, since people tend to 
underreport their own income. This means that income is measured with some significant 
error. Hence, in this study it is assumed that correcting for income underreporting using 
‘better’ collected consumption data provides a better living standard measure for correct 
analysis. Although the study has accounted for the quality of the income variable using the 
consumption expenditure from the survey data, it still acknowledges the limitations (which 
mainly entail that surveys exclude top income earners) described in subsection 4.2. 
However, what would the results have looked like if the study had utilised the income 
variable without correcting for underreporting? If the study had directly employed the raw 
(survey) income variable, the consequence is that the incidence and redistribution analyses 
would have been underestimated. But since this study has used the most recent large 
nationally representative living standard survey, it is believed that the adjusted income data 
can still be used as a reasonable representation of reality to undertake analyses of the 
incidence and redistributive effect of taxes.  
 
Third, since oil related taxes (CIT) contribute a large share to Nigeria’s total tax revenue, it is 
important to calculate their incidence and redistributive effects. However, data relating to 
these taxes is not in the Nigeria survey. Since there is no properly recorded oil related 
data/CIT in the survey, the study cannot directly allocate these type of taxes to individual 
households to enable meaningful analyses. Hence, the main analyses in this work only focus 
on taxes (PIT and VAT) relevant to households, and not on CIT, which involves several 
uncertain assumptions, making it very difficult to determine the distribution of its final 
economic incidence (Ataguba 2012; Inchauste and Lustig 2017). If the study had accounted 
for CIT, total household taxes would have been overstated, since these taxes are not directly 
relevant to micro households.   
 
Fourth, this study has assumed a very simple micro-simulation model, unable to study the 
entire fiscal system. It has only considered two specific taxation policies, rather than the 
entire fiscal system. The study has relied on this assumption mainly due to data limitations. 
On the taxation side, the simulation model is not able to analyse more than the PIT and VAT 
policy instruments, since the survey data does not contain adequate information to calculate 
CIT or oil related taxes. On the expenditure side, the study does not have enough 
information on transfers and subsidies that the government grants to poor households. 
However, if the assumption here was relaxed, and there was access to adequate information 
on taxation and expenditure policies, then the simulation model would have yielded a more 
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detailed analysis on the net effect of fiscal policies on poverty and income inequality. More 
so, the simple model does not account for behavioural and second round effects. Otherwise, 
the inequality and poverty dynamics estimated in this work would be interpreted as 
demonstrating purely causal effects of changing taxation policies.  
 
Fifth, the study assumes that informal sector activities evade taxes. Hence, the tax laws have 
only been applied on formal sector earnings. Although the living standard survey utilised in 
this paper differentiates between formal and informal incomes, the study is somewhat 
hampered from applying the tax rule on informal incomes. It has accounted for informality by 
applying the formal PIT laws on formal earnings and the effective VAT rates on household 
taxable consumption expenditures respectively. Hence the conclusions reached here are 
mainly focused on formal taxes. This is because informal participants tend to dodge taxes. 
Notably, the current study has only described the size of household participation in economic 
activities in both formal and informal sectors, with their corresponding annual average 
incomes. This description (see Table 2 above) exposed a large under and untaxed informal 
sector, relative to the small, taxed formal sector. Hence, the need for government effort to 
draw informal sector workers into the national tax net. But what change would have occurred 
to the main results had the study entirely ignored the existence of the informal sector? If the 
study had failed to account for informality, and directly applied the tax rules on both formal 
and informal earnings, then the change in the results would be an overestimate of the true 
equity and redistributive effect of PIT and VAT.  
  
Regardless of the limitations mentioned above, the results from this study are still consistent 
with the outcomes of related previous studies in the taxation literature, and this supports the 
validity of its analysis. First, in line with previous studies, the equity analysis suggests that 
income taxation initially designed to be progressive may still turn out to be regressive. 
Meticulous tax reform, with regulated relief allowance (entirely excluding high-income 
taxpayers from sharing in the variable part) and well-targeted higher rates for the wealthy 
class, could be helpful in enhancing the equity and redistributive potential of the income tax 
policy. It is also suggested that differentiated VAT rates, i.e. a higher rate on luxury items and 
a lesser rate on consumable items, may help to achieve better fairness and redistribution of 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 9 Pre-2011 income tax structure in Nigeria, 1993 laws  
s/n Steps Taxable income  Tax rate 
1 First  20,000 5% 
2 Second 20,000 10% 
3 Third 40,000 15% 
4 Fourth  40,000 20% 
5 Above 120,000 25% 
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, PIT Act, No. 104, 1993.  
Note: 1 Thresholds of annual income.  
2 Individuals with no taxable income are charged 0.5% of their total income. 
 
Table 10 Post-2011 income tax structure in Nigeria, 2011 to date  
s/n Steps Taxable income Tax rate 
1 First  300,000 7% 
2 Second 300,000 11% 
3 Third 500,000 15% 
4 Fourth  500,000 19% 
5 Fifth 1,600,000 21% 
6 Above 3,200,000 24% 
Source: Official Gazette of Federal Republic of Nigeria, PIT (Amendment) Act, 2011  
Note: 1 Thresholds of annual income.  
2 Individuals with no taxable income are charged 1% of their total income. 
 
Table 11 Description of the simulation scenarios for the redistributive effect of PIT 
 0 N1 N2 
Income components  Base Pre-2011 PIT Post-2011 PIT 
Labour income X N1 N2 
Crop income  X X X 
Livestock income  X X X 
Fishing income  X X X 
Self-employment income X N1 N2 
Transfers income X X X 
Other income  X X X 
Source: Author’s description.  
Note: X = values estimated from the survey. N1 = net of PIT (pre-2011 scheme).  
N2 = net of PIT (post-2011 scheme). 
 
Table 12 Description of the simulation scenarios for the redistributive effect of VAT 
 0 N1 N2 
Consumption components  Base Pre-2020 VAT Post-2020 VAT 
Vatable items X N1 N2 
Non-vatable items X X X 
Other non-food items X X X 
Total food items X X X 
Source: Author’s description. 
Note: X = values estimated from the survey. N1 = net of VAT (pre-2020 scheme)  




Table 13 Confidence intervals of average incomes of Nigeria households 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Conf. interval 
Wage employment    
  Nigeria 802127.4 2307513.6 746226.6    858028.3 
Urban 944851 1890452.1 875477.3     1014225 
Rural 691790.1 1890452.1 608582.7    774997.6 
Farming activity    
Nigeria 73165.5 286883.54    69384.77    76946.22 
Urban 39727.86 382579 30644.44    48811.29 
Rural 88059.93 230332.58 84410.41    91709.44 
Self-employment    
Nigeria 912862.7 4172222.1 852480.5    973244.9 
Urban 1263510 5832248.5 1122895     1404124 




Table 14 Confidence intervals of estimated effects of PIT under each scenario 
Estimates without informal sector correction 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Conf. interval 
National estimates    
Inequality indicator    
0Gini 0.3895 0.0029 0.3836   0.3953 
1Gini 0.3737 0.0030 0.3678   0.3797 
2Gini 0.3869 0.0028 0.3812   0.3925 
Poverty headcount    
0pov0 0.4183 0.0000 0.4183   0.4183 
1pov0 0.4622 0.0000 0.4622   0.4622 
2pov0 0.4224 0.0000 0.4224   0.4224 
Poverty gap    
0pov1 0.1749 0.0000 0.1749   0.1749 
1pov1 0.1906 0.0000 0.1906   0.1906 
2pov1 0.1768 0.0000 0.1768   0.1768 
Poverty severity    
0pov2 0.1079 0.0000 0.1079   0.1079 
1pov2 0.1154 0.0000 0.1154   0.1154 
2pov2 0.1089 0.0000 0.1089   0.1089 
Urban estimates    
Inequality indicator    
0Gini 0.3614 0.0064 0.3489    0.3739 
1Gini 0.3478 0.0066 0.3348    0.3608 
2Gini 0.3571 0.0062 0.3450    0.3693 
Poverty headcount    
0pov0 0.2308 0.0000 0.2308    0.2308 
1pov0 0.2670 0.0000 0.2670    0.2670 
2pov0 0.2340 0.0000 0.2340    0.2340 
Poverty gap    
0pov1 0.1021 0.0000 0.1021    0.1021 
1pov1 0.1117 0.0000 0.1117    0.1117 
2pov1 0.1031 0.0000 0.1031    0.1031 
Poverty severity    
0pov2 0.0745 0.0000 0.0745    0.0745 
1pov2 0.0781 0.0000 0.0781    0.0781 
2pov2 0.0749 0.0000 0.0749    0.0749 
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Rural estimates    
Inequality indicator    
0Gini 0.3763 0.0026 0.3712    0.3813 
1Gini 0.3606 0.0025 0.3557    0.3655 
2Gini 0.3747 0.0025 0.3698    0.3796 
Poverty headcount    
0pov0 0.5018 0.0000 0.5018    0.5018 
1pov0 0.5491 0.0000 0.5491    0.5491 
2pov0 0.5063 0.0000 0.5063    0.5062 
Poverty gap    
0pov1 0.2074 0.0000 0.2074    0.2074 
1pov1 0.2258 0.0000 0.2258    0.2258 
2pov1 0.2097 0.0000 0.2097    0.2097 
Poverty severity    
0pov2 0.1228 0.0000 0.1228    0.1228 
1pov2 0.1321 0.0000 0.1321     0.1321 
2pov2 0.1241 0.0000 0.1241    0.1241 
Estimates with informal sector correction 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Conf. interval 
National estimates    
Inequality indicator    
0Gini 0.3895 0.0029 0.3836    0.3953 
1Gini 0.3888 0.0029 0.3829    0.3946 
2Gini 0.3894 0.0029 0.3836    0.3953 
Poverty headcount     
0pov0 0.4183 0.0000 0.4183   0.4183 
1pov0 0.4222 0.0000 0.4222   0.4222 
2pov0 0.4189 0.0000 0.4189   0.4189 
Poverty gap    
0pov1 0.1749 0.0000 0.1749   0.1749 
1pov1 0.1765 0.0000 0.1765   0.1765 
2pov1 0.1751 0.0000 0.1751   0.1751 
Poverty severity     
0pov2 0.1079 0.0000 0.1079   0.1079 
1pov2 0.1087 0.0000 0.1087   0.1087 
2pov2 0.1080 0.0000 0.1080   0.1080 
Urban estimates    
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Inequality indicator    
0Gini 0.3614 0.0064 0.3489    0.3739 
1Gini 0.3610 0.0064 0.3484    0.3735 
2Gini 0.3613 0.0064 0.3488    0.3738 
Poverty headcount     
0pov0 0.2308 0.0000 0.2308    0.2308 
1pov0 0.2320 0.0000 0.2330    0.2330 
2pov0 0.2313 0.0000 0.2313    0.2313 
Poverty gap    
0pov1 0.1021 0.0000 0.1021    0.1021 
1pov1 0.1027 0.0000 0.1027    0.1027 
2pov1 0.1022 0.0000 0.1022    0.1022 
Poverty severity     
0pov2 0.0745 0.0000 0.0745    0.0745 
1pov2 0.0747 0.0000 0.0747    0.0747 
2pov2 0.0745 0.0000 0.0745    0.0745 
Rural estimates    
Inequality indicator    
0Gini 0.3763 0.0026 0.3712    0.3813 
1Gini 0.3755 0.0026 0.3704     0.3805 
2Gini 0.3762 0.0026 0.3712    0.3812 
Poverty headcount     
0pov0 0.5018 0.0000 0.5018    0.5018 
1pov0 0.5039 0.0000 0.5039    0.5039 
2pov0 0.5024 0.0000 0.5024    0.5024 
Poverty gap    
0pov1 0.2074 0.0000 0.2074    0.2074 
1pov1 0.2084 0.0000 0.2084    0.2084 
2pov1 0.2076 0.0000 0.2076    0.2076 
Poverty severity     
0pov2 0.1228 0.0000 0.1228    0.1228 
1pov2 0.1233 0.0000 0.1233    0.1233 




Table 15 Confidence intervals of estimated effects of VAT under each scenario 
Estimates without informal sector correction 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Conf. interval 
National estimates    
Inequality indicator    
0Gini 0.3892 0.0028 0.3835   0.3949 
1Gini 0.3911 0.0028 0.3854   0.3968 
2Gini 0.3921 0.0028 0.3864   0.3977 
Poverty headcount    
0pov0 0.3881 0.0000 0.3881   0.3881 
1pov0 0.3921 0.0000 0.3921   0.3921 
2pov0 0.3943 0.0000 0.3943   0.3943 
Poverty gap    
0pov1 0.1311 0.0000 0.1311   0.1311 
1pov1 0.1341 0.0000 0.1341   0.1341 
2pov1 0.1356 0.0000 0.1356   0.1356 
Poverty severity    
0pov2 0.0600 0.0000 0.0600   0.0600 
1pov2 0.0621 0.0000 0.0621   0.0621 
2pov2 0.0632 0.0000 0.0632   0.0632 
Urban estimates    
Inequality indicator    
0Gini 0.3603 0.0061 0.3483    0.3722 
1Gini 0.3615 0.0061 0.3496    0.3735 
2Gini 0.3622 0.0061 0.3502    0.3742 
Poverty headcount    
0pov0 0.1836 0.0000 0.1836    0.1836 
1pov0 0.1868 0.0000 0.1868     0.1868 
2pov0 0.1890 0.0000 0.1890    0.1890 
Poverty gap    
0pov1 0.0476 0.0000 0.0476    0.0476 
1pov1 0.0490 0.0000 0.0490    0.0490 
2pov1 0.0498 0.0000 0.0498    0.0498 
Poverty severity    
0pov2 0.0184 0.0000 0.0184    0.0184 
1pov2 0.0191 0.0000 0.0191    0.0191 
2pov2 0.0195 0.0000 0.0195    0.0195 
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Rural estimates    
Inequality indicator    
0Gini 0.3763 0.0025 0.3713    0.3812 
1Gini 0.3785 0.0025 0.3735    0.3834 
2Gini 0.3796 0.0025 0.3747     0.3845 
Poverty headcount    
0pov0 0.4792 0.0000 0.4792     0.4792 
1pov0 0.4835 0.0000 0.4835    0.4835 
2pov0 0.4857 0.0000 0.4857    0.4857 
Poverty gap    
0pov1 0.1683 0.0000 0.1683    0.1683 
1pov1 0.1720 0.0000 0.1720    0.1720 
2pov1 0.1739 0.0000 0.1739    0.1739 
Poverty severity    
0pov2 0.0786 0.0000 0.0786    0.0786 
1pov2 0.0813 0.0000 0.0813    0.0813 
2pov2 0.0826 0.0000 0.0827    0.0827 
Estimates with informal sector correction 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Conf. interval 
National estimates    
Inequality indicator    
0Gini 0.3892 0.0028 0.3835   0.3949 
1Gini 0.3901 0.0028 0.3845   0.3958 
2Gini 0.3906 0.0028 0.3850   0.3963 
Poverty headcount     
0pov0 0.3881 0.0000 0.3881   0.3881 
1pov0 0.3903 0.0000 0.3903   0.3903 
2pov0 0.3915 0.0000 0.3915   0.3915 
Poverty gap    
0pov1 0.1311 0.0000 0.1311   0.1311 
1pov1 0.1323 0.0000 0.1323   0.1323 
2pov1 0.1333 0.0000 0.1333   0.1333 
Poverty severity     
0pov2 0.0600 0.0000 0.0600   0.0600 
1pov2 0.0609 0.0000 0.0609   0.0609 
2pov2 0.0616 0.0000 0.0616   0.0616 
Urban estimates    
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Inequality indicator    
0Gini 0.3603 0.0061 0.3483    0.3722 
1Gini 0.3609 0.0061 0.3489    0.3729 
2Gini 0.3612 0.0061 0.3493    0.3732 
Poverty headcount     
0pov0 0.1836 0.0000 0.1836    0.1836 
1pov0 0.1851 0.0000 0.1851    0.1851 
2pov0 0.1860 0.0000 0.1860    0.1860 
Poverty gap    
0pov1 0.0476 0.0000 0.0476     0.0476 
1pov1 0.0483 0.0000 0.0483    0.0483 
2pov1 0.0487 0.0000 0.0487    0.0487 
Poverty severity     
0pov2 0.0184 0.0000 0.0184    0.0184 
1pov2 0.0188 0.0000 0.0188    0.0188 
2pov2 0.0189 0.0000 0.0189    0.0189 
Rural estimates    
Inequality indicator    
0Gini 0.3763 0.0025 0.3713    0.3812 
1Gini 0.3774 0.0025 0.3724    0.3823 
2Gini 0.3779 0.0025 0.3730    0.3829 
Poverty headcount     
0pov0 0.4792 0.0000 0.4792     0.4792 
1pov0 0.4822 0.0000 0.4822    0.4822 
2pov0 0.4831 0.0000 0.4831    0.4831 
Poverty gap    
0pov1 0.1683 0.0000 0.1683    0.1683 
1pov1 0.1701 0.0000 0.1701    0.1701 
2pov1 0.1711 0.0000 0.1711    0.1711 
Poverty severity     
0pov2 0.0786 0.0000 0.0786    0.0786 
1pov2 0.0799 0.0000 0.0799    0.0799 




Figure 2 Lorenz curves under base, pre-2011 and post-2011 PIT scenarios 
 
 
Figure 3 Lorenz curves under base, pre-2020 and post-2020 VAT scenarios 
 
